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DO REITS OUTPERFORM STOCKS AND FIXED-INCOME  
ASSETS? NEW EVIDENCE FROM MEAN-VARIANCE AND  




This paper re-examines the performance of REITs, stocks, and fixed-income assets 
based on the preferences of risk-averse and risk-seeking investors using mean-variance 
and stochastic dominance approaches. Our findings indicate no first-order stochastic 
dominance and no arbitrage opportunity among these assets. However, our stochastic 
dominance results reveal that in order to maximize their expected utility, the risk-averse 
prefer fixed-income assets over real estate, which, in turn, is preferable to stocks. On the 
other hand, to maximize their expected utility, all risk-seeking investors would prefer to 
invest in stocks than in real estate, but real estate, in turn, is preferable to fixed-income 
assets.      
 
 
Keywords: stochastic dominance, risk, REITs, stock, fixed-income assets, 
risk-aversion, risk-seeking.




 The collapse of the dot-com mania in 2000 led investors to reshape their market 
expectations. Instead of sticking to the traditional choice between stocks and bonds, 
investors, motivated by expectations of falling interest rates, switched to real estate 
markets to maximize their portfolio returns.  Investments in real estate are known to 
trade less frequently and bear high transaction costs.  Alternatively, real estate 
investment trusts (REITs) offer investors a better instrument, one that is more liquid and 
has lower transaction costs compared with traditional real estate investment.  
 In recent years, REITs have developed into a relatively more efficient real estate 
instrument. Starting in 1992, REITs have grown significantly in both size and number.  
This is due to the fact that REITs pay stable dividends and are less sensitive to the state 
of the general economy. Lee and Stevenson (2005) document that REITs provide 
diversification benefits to mixed-asset portfolios, benefits that appear to come from both 
the enhanced returns on REITs and their reduced risk. 
 The statistical analysis of the relationship between real estate returns and the returns 
on other asset classes is important to investors, since it provides information to guide 
portfolio management. In the standard portfolio approach, the return differentials should 
reflect the risk differentials or other financial characteristics. Since returns on financial 
assets are often found to display skewness and leptokurtosis (see, e.g., Peiró, 1999; 
Patton, 2004; Brooks, et al., 2005), investors’ concerns about portfolio return 
distributions cannot be fully captured by the first two moments. Otherwise, the 
portfolio’s true riskiness will be underestimated. This motivates us to conduct a 
statistical analysis to evaluate REITs against stocks and fixed-income assets by 
considering the effect of the higher moments of the returns. This paper introduces an 
alternative technique for examining the performance of these assets that accounts for the 
preferences of risk-averters and risk-seekers among these assets. In particular, we 
re-examine market efficiency and the behavior of risk-averters and risk-seekers via a 
stochastic dominance (SD) approach by using the whole distribution of returns from 
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these assets. To our knowledge, this is the first paper that uses SD techniques to analyze 
real estate returns.  
 As stated earlier, empirical studies have shown that asset returns may not be 
adequately described by the first two moments (Peiró, 1999; Harvey and Siddique, 
2000; Patton, 2004; Brooks, et al., 2005; Smith, 2007). In particular, in most situations, 
the Gaussian assumption does not hold, distribution is skewed to either left or right, and 
fat tails present in the asset return series. Researchers recognize that using traditional 
mean-variance (MV) or CAPM-based models to analyze investment decisions is 
appropriate only when the return series is normally distributed or investors’ preferences 
are quadratic. Since the MV and CAPM criteria are restricted to the first two moments 
of the data, important information contained in the higher moments is ignored and, 
hence, group reactions may be neglected and investors may tend to get overconfident 
and take unsuspected risk. To overcome the shortcomings associated with the MV and 
CAPM-based models and to investigate the entire distributions of the returns directly, 
we employ a non-parametric SD approach to analyze the returns of REITs against three 
stock index returns and two fixed-income investments.  
 The assumptions underlying SD are less restrictive than those of the MV and CAPM 
models. In addition, SD that reveals the entire distribution covers all information from 
the distribution, rather than just the first two moments, as postulated by MV, and 
requires no precise assessment of the specific form of investors’ risk preference or 
utility function. Comparing portfolios using the SD approach is equivalent to making 
asset choice by employing utility maximization. It also allows us to determine if an 
arbitrage opportunity exists among the investment alternatives, so that once an arbitrage 
opportunity is identified, investors can increase their expected utility, and hence their 
wealth, by setting up zero dollar portfolios to exploit this opportunity. 
 Examining the data over the entire sample period of 1999-2005, this study finds that 
all REITs (except mortgage REITs) dominate the three stock indices but not fixed 
income investments using the mean-variance criterion. The results also show that there 
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is no first-order SD between REITs and alternative assets, implying that investors 
cannot increase their wealth by switching from one asset to another. However, REITs 
stochastically dominate the stock index investments, but they are stochastically 
dominated by Treasury constant maturity at the second and third order for risk-averters. 
On the other hand, the reverse holds true for risk-seekers. These results reveal that to 
maximize their expected utility, all risk-averse investors would prefer to invest in real 
estate than in the stock market. However, if we compare REITs with fixed-income 
assets, they would prefer fixed-income assets. On the other hand, to maximize their 
expected utility, all risk-seeking investors would prefer to invest in stocks than in real 
estate, which, in turn, is preferable to fixed-income assets.      
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a literature 
review, which motivates us to conduct the SD analysis. Section 3 describes the data and 
methodologies. Section 4 presents the empirical results and provides our explanation. 
Section 5 contains the conclusion. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Returns on REITs have been extensively studied in the literature. A large and 
growing body of research examines REITs’ efficiency.1 Some researchers suggest that 
real estate returns are more predictable than the returns of other assets. Nelling and 
Gyourko (1998) find evidence that monthly returns on equity REITs are predictable 
using past performance. However, the predictability is not substantial enough to cover 
typical transaction costs, so that there is no evidence of unexploited arbitrage 
opportunities. Ling and Naranjo (2003) find that equity REIT flows are significantly 
positively related to the previous quarter's flows and negatively related to flows from 
two quarters ago. 
 Using a variant of time-series correlations, many researchers have attempted to 
analyze the determinants of REIT returns. For instance, Peterson and Hsieh (1997) 
report that the return behavior of REITs is similar to that of a portfolio of small stocks.  
                                                        
1 Anderson et al. (2000) review the REIT efficiency literature. 
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Swanson et al. (2002) find that REIT returns are more sensitive to the maturity rate 
spread between short- and long-term Treasuries than to the credit rate spread between 
commercial bonds and Treasuries. They also find that REIT returns are significantly 
related to the default spread on returns and the term spread on interest rates. Moreover, 
Chui et al. (2003) report that in the pre-1990 period, REIT returns are affected by 
market momentum, firm size, turnover, and analyst coverage. In the post-1990 period, 
REIT returns are predominantly affected by market momentum. In addition, there are 
conflicting results as to whether REIT returns are negatively related to their 
market-to-book value. 
 A number of studies (e.g., McIntosh et al., 1991; Khoo et al., 1993) have observed 
an apparent decline in the market betas of equity REITs. If the decline is of statistical 
and economic significance, the implication is that estimates of equity REIT betas that 
rely on historical returns are biased upward. Chiang et al. (2005) find weak evidence for 
a decline in equity REIT betas based on a single-factor model. However, when the 
three-factor model is used, the declining trend in equity REIT betas disappears.  
 Firstenberg et al. (1988) and Liu et al. (1992) have suggested that real estate returns 
may not be independent over time. They find strong autocorrelation in real estate 
returns. Sagalyn (1990) and Goldstein and Nelling (1999) show that REITs’ risk and 
return are dependent on business cycles and the direction of market returns. They find 
that REITs more closely track the return of the stock market in a down market than in an 
up market. A low beta in an up market may be due to the decline in the relationship 
between REITs and the stock market.  
 Numerous studies have tested the efficient characteristics of REITs vis-a-vis the 
stock market. The evidence has been mixed. Specifically, Ambrose et al. (1992) and 
Seck (1996) report that equity REITs and the S&P 500 behave as a random walk and 
find that the real estate and stock markets are not segmented. Kleiman et al. (2002) 
provides further evidence of random walk behavior and weak-form efficiency in 
international real estate markets in Europe, Asia, and North America by applying the 
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unit root, variance ratio, and runs tests. On the other hand, Kuhle and Alvayay (2000) 
find evidence of inefficiency in the price of 108 equity REIT companies during 
1989-1998. Jirasakuldech and Knight (2005) find that from 1972 to 2004, efficiency 
increased for equity REITs and the Russell 2000 index of small capitalization stocks. 
Some predictability, but not necessarily inefficiency, persists for mortgage REITs and 
hybrid REITs. 
 Several studies test the market efficiency hypothesis for REITs by examining the 
seasonality and predictability of REITs. Colwell and Park (1990) find evidence of 
seasonality and the January effect in 28 equity REITs and 22 mortgage REITs between 
1964 and 1986. Mclntosh et al. (1991) find size effect in REITs: small firms perform 
better than large firms. Bharati and Gupta (1992) document the profitable trading rules 
of REITs after transaction costs are considered. Liu and Mei (1992) suggest that 
expected excess returns on equity REITs are more predictable than those of small cap 
stocks and bonds. They decompose excess returns into expected and unexpected excess 
returns to examine what determines movements in expected excess returns because 
equity REITs are more predictable than all other assets.  On the other hand, Liu et al. 
(1990) and Li and Wang (1995) provide evidence suggesting that REITs and the general 
stock market are integrated and that there is no predictability in the REIT markets. 
 Although there is a substantial amount of research on market efficiency, these 
studies mainly investigate the correlations of dependency over time and/or correlations 
with other state variables. Very few attempts go beyond the second moments, but there 
are some exceptions.  For instance, Liu et al. (1992) document that co-skewness offers 
some explanation for REIT returns. However, Vines et al. (1994) and Cheng (2005) 
cannot find supporting evidence in favor of co-skewness as an explanation for REIT 
returns. These mixed findings may arise because different statistical tools were used in 
these studies, some of which may suffer from mis-specification or distributional 
problems. In this paper, as mentioned in the introduction, we apply an SD approach to 
analyze the returns of REITs against three stock index returns and two Treasury constant 
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maturities. This approach allows us to examine the first three moments of the return 
series by focusing on the choice of assets via utility maximization. 
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 To provide broader and consistent evidence, we use daily returns2 of all REITs, 
equity REITs, mortgage REITs, and US-DS real estate in our empirical examination. 
The data are taken from the National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts. The 
index series is based to December 1971=100. To simplify, we call this asset group 
REITs. We compare REITs with three common stock indices: Dow Jones Industrials, the 
NASDAQ, and the S&P 500; and two fixed-income assets: the 10-year Treasury note 
and 3-month Treasury bill rate. Data for the stock indices are obtained from Yahoo 
Finance; data for the Treasury constant maturities are from the Federal Reserve Bank of 
St. Louis. The sample covers the period from January 1999 through December 2005. 
Most REIT risk/return studies model risk using the CAPM-based model or MV of 
asset returns. The standard CAPM identifies two types of risk associated with an 
investment in REITs.  For instance, Shalit and Yitzhaki (2002) link the poor empirical 
performance of betas to non-normality in return distributions and inadequate 
specification of investor utility functions. Enders (1995) maintains that if the investor’s 
utility function is quadratic and/or the excess returns from holding the asset are 
normally distributed, an increase in the variance of returns is equivalent to an increase 
in “risk.” The non-normal aspects of the financial data have been modeled by different 
distributions and fat tails (Loretan and Phillips, 1994; McDonald and Xu, 1995; Smith, 
2007). However, closed-form expressions for the density functions of stable random 
variables are available only for special cases, such as the normal, the Cauchy, and the 
Bernoulli cases. However, the fat-tailed distributions have no mathematically closed 
form, making them grudgingly reliant on parameter estimations. To address the issue, 
Sivitanides (1998) and Sing and Ong (2000) propose that portfolios generated with a 
downside risk (DR) framework are more efficient than those generated with a classic 
                                                        
2 We also use weekly data to check the robustness and find similar results. Results are available upon request.  
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MV and have better risk-return trade-offs. However, as pointed out by Cheng and 
Wolverton (2001), a non-stable return distribution is a problem in the application of DR 
and modern portfolio theory models. In light of the above considerations and evidence, 
it is clear that if normality does not hold, the MV criterion may produce some 
misleading results. To circumvent this problem, we use the SD approach in this paper. 
Porter and Gaumnitz (1972) generate a Markowitz MV efficient set of portfolios 
from 140 stocks and apply first-, second-, and third-degree SD tests. They report that 
the most significant difference between the MV and SD portfolios is the tendency for 
SD to eliminate low return-low variance portfolios. Although they conclude that the 
choice between SD and MV models is not critical, the MV rule can lead highly 
risk-averse investors to make choices inconsistent with maximizing their expected 
utility. 
For any two investments with variables for profit and return iY  and jY  with 
means iµ  and jµ  and standard deviations iσ  and jσ , respectively, jY  is said to 
dominate iY  by the MV criterion if jµ ≥ iµ  and jσ ≤ iσ  . The MV and CAPM 
criteria depend on the existence of normal return distributions and quadratic utility 
functions and are not appropriate if return distributions are not normal or if investors’ 
utility functions are not quadratic (Feldstein, 1969; Hakansson, 1972).   
 To illustrate the tenets of the SD approach, let F and G be the cumulative 
distribution functions (CDFs) and let f and g be the corresponding probability density 
functions (PDFs) of two assets Y and Z, respectively, with common support of [a, b], 
where a < b. Define:  
0 0
A DH H h= = , ( ) ( )1
xA A
j ja
H x H t dt−= ∫  and ( ) ( )1
bD D
j jx
H x H t dt−= ∫    (1) 
for h = f or g , ,H F G= ; 1, 2,3j = , where the superscript A refers to ascending and 
the superscript D refers to descending.  
 We note that AjH  can be used to develop the SD theory for risk-averters (see, for 
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example, Quirk and Saposnik, 1962; Fishburn, 1964), whereas DjH  can be used to 
develop the SD theory for risk-seekers (see, for example, Meyer, 1977; Stoyan, 1983; 
Wong and Chan, 2007).  As AjH  is integrated from 1
A
jH −  in ascending order from 
the leftmost point of downside risk, we call the SD for risk-averters ascending 
stochastic dominance (ASD) and call the integral AjH  the 
thj order ascending 
cumulative distribution function (ACDF) or simply the thj order ASD integral.  On the 
other hand, as DjH  is integrated from 1
D
jH −  in descending order from the rightmost 
point of upside profit, we call the SD for risk-seekers descending stochastic dominance 
(DSD) and call the integral DjH  the 
thj order descending cumulative distribution 
function (DCDF) or simply the thj order DSD integral for j = 1, 2 and 33  and for 
H F= and G .  These definitions can be used to examine both risk-averse and 
risk-seeking preferences. FASD refers to first-order (ascending) stochastic dominance, 
SASD refers to second-order (ascending) stochastic dominance, and TASD refers to 
third-order (ascending) stochastic dominance for risk-averters.  Likewise, similar 
definitions are applied to risk-seekers.  Particularly, FDSD refers to first-order 
(descending) stochastic dominance, SDSD refers to second-order (descending) stochastic 
dominance, and TDSD refers to third-order (descending) stochastic dominance for 
risk-seekers.   
The most commonly used ASD rules contain three broadly defined utility functions for 
risk-averters: 
• investors exhibit non-satiation (more is preferred to less) under FASD; 
• investors exhibit non-satiation and risk aversion under SASD;  
                                                        
3 In his analysis of 1281 mutual funds, Vinod (2004) recommends employing the fourth-order SD to choose among 
investment prospects. However, the first three orders are the most commonly used in SD for empirical analyses. We 
shall keep this convention in this paper.  
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• investors exhibit non-satiation, risk aversion, and decreasing absolute risk 
aversion (DARA) under TASD. 
Similarly, the most commonly used DSD rules correspond with three broadly 
defined utility functions for risk-seekers:  
•  investors exhibit non-satiation (more is preferred to less) under FDSD;  
• investors exhibit non-satiation and risk seeking under SDSD;  
•  investors exhibit non-satiation, risk seeking, and decreasing absolute risk 
aversion (DARA) under TDSD.  
It is important to differentiate the SD rules for risk-averters and risk-seekers, 
respectively.  These rules are given in the following sub-sections.   
3.1. SD for the Risk-Averse 
 Following Quirk and Saposnik (1962), Fishburn (1964), and Hanoch and Levy 
(1969), we outline the SD rules for risk-averters as:  
i. Asset Y dominates asset Z by FASD (denoted 
1Y Z  or 1F G ), if and only if 
( ) ( )xGxF AA 11 ≤ ;  
ii. Asset Y dominates asset Z by SASD (denoted 
2Y Z  or 2F G ), if and only if 
( ) ( )xGxF AA 22 ≤ ;  
iii. Asset Y dominates asset Z by TASD (denoted 3Y Z  or 3F G ), if and only 
if ( ) ( )xGxF AA 33 ≤ ;             (2) 
for all possible returns x, with strict inequality for at least one value of x, where AjF  
and AjG  are defined in (1) for 1,2,3j = .        
  The existence of SD implies that investors’ expected utility is always higher under 
the dominant asset than under the dominated asset, and, consequently, the dominated 
asset would never be chosen. Note that a hierarchical relationship exists in SD: 
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first-order SD implies second-order SD, which, in turn, implies third-order SD. 
However, the converse cannot be true: a finding that second-order SD exists does not 
imply the existence of first-order SD. Likewise, a finding that third-order SD exists does 
not imply the existence of second-order SD or first-order SD. Thus, in practice, the 
lowest dominance order of SD is reported. Moreover, it is generally recognized that 
asset Y stochastically dominates asset Z at first order, if and only if there is an arbitrage 
opportunity between Y and Z, such that the investor will increase wealth as well as 
utility if investment is shifted from Z to Y (Jarrow, 1986). Hence, the SD approach 
provides a tool for revealing arbitrage opportunities among investment prospects. 
Hanoch and Levy (1969) indicate risk-averse investors will increase their utility but not 
necessarily their wealth by switching portfolios. The existence of second-order or 
third-order SD does not imply any arbitrage opportunity, and neither does it imply the 
failure of market efficiency or market rationality.4  
3.2. SD for Risk-Seekers 
The theory of SD for risk-seekers is also well established (Hammond, 1974; Meyer, 
1977; Stoyan, 1983; Levy and Wiener, 1998; Wong and Li, 1999; Anderson, 2004). The 
SD rules for risk-seekers are: 
i. Asset Y dominates asset Z by FDSD (denoted 1Y Z  or 1F G ), if and only 
 if ( ) ( )xGxF DD
11
≥ ;  
ii. Asset Y dominates asset Z by SDSD (denoted 2Y Z  or 2F G ), if and only 
 if ( ) ( )xGxF DD 22 ≥ ; and 
iii. Asset Y dominates asset Z by TDSD (denoted 3Y Z  or 3F G ), if and only 
 if ( ) ( )xGxF DD 33 ≥ ;             (3) 
for all possible returns x, with strict inequality for at least one value of x, where DjF  
                                                        
4 See Jarrow (1986), Falk and Levy (1989), Bernard and Seyhun (1997), and Larsen and Resnick (1999) for more 
discussion about applying SD to test for market rationality and market efficiency. 
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and DjG  are defined in (1) for 1,2,3j = .             
Owing to its superiority in comparing prospects, the SD theory used to compare 
returns for both risk-averters and risk-seekers is well established. The advantages of SD 
have motivated previous studies to use SD techniques to analyze many financial puzzles 
(see, e.g., Seyhun, 1993; Larsen and Resnick, 1999; Kjetsaa and Kieff, 2003). 
Unfortunately, previous research was unable to determine the statistical significance of 
SD. However, recent advances in SD techniques allow researchers to determine the 
statistical significance. To date, the SD tests for the risk-averse have been well 
developed and documented by McFadden (1989), Klecan et al. (1991), Kaur et al. 
(1994), Anderson (1996, 2004), Davidson and Duclos (2000), Barrett and Donald 
(2003), and Linton et al. (2005). 
 Although Barrett and Donald’s (2003) test is a powerful instrument and Linton et 
al.’s (2005) test is useful because it is an extension of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for 
FASD and SASD by relaxing the iid assumption, the SD test developed by Davidson 
and Duclos (DD, 2000) is found to be one of the least conservative and most powerful 
SD tests, as argued by Tse and Zhang (2004) and Lean et al. (2006). We report the 
results of DD’s test to determine whether statistically significant SD occurs between 
REITs and other assets and skip those of BD’s and Linton et al.’s tests, since the results 
of both BD’s and Linton et al.’s tests are consistent with those of DD’s test.  
3.3. Davidson and Duclos Test 
 To elucidate the DD test, let {( iy , iz )} be pairs of observations drawn from the 
random variables Y and Z with distribution functions F and G, respectively. For a grid of 
pre-selected points x1, x2… xk, the order-j ascending DD test statistic (which, in this 
paper, is also called the DD test statistic for the risk-averse or ADDj), ( )AjT x  (j = 1, 2 
and 3), is given by:   











= ,            (4) 
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where ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( ) 2 ( ),
j j j
A A A A
j F G FGV x V x V x V x= + −  
1
1




















1 1ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( ) , , ; , ;
(( 1)!)









jA j A A
FG i i j j
i
V x x h H x H F G h y z
N N j









= − − = =⎢ ⎥−⎣ ⎦
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 Because, empirically, it is impossible to test the null hypothesis for the full support 
of the distributions, Bishop et al. (1992) propose to test the null hypothesis for a 
pre-designed finite numbers of values of x. Specifically, the following hypotheses are 
tested: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )




: ( ) ( ) ,  for all , 1,2,..., ;
: ( ) ( ) for some  but , ;
:  for all and  for some ;
:  for all and  for some ;
A A
j i j i i
A A
A j i j i i
A A A A
A j i j i i j i j i i
A A A A
A j i j i i j i j i i
H F x G x x i k
H F x G x x F G F G
H F x G x x F x G x x






  (5) 
where the integrals AjF  and 
A
jG  are defined as in (1) for 1, 2,3j =  and F G/  means 
F does not dominate G and vice versa. It should be noted that in the above hypotheses, 
AH  is set to be exclusive of both 1AH  and 2AH , meaning that if the test accepts 1AH  
or 2AH , it will not classify them as AH . Under the null hypothesis, DD show that 
( )AjT x  is asymptotically distributed as the studentized maximum modulus (SMM) 
distribution (Richmond, 1982) to account for joint test size. To implement the DD test, 
the t-statistic, AjT , at each grid point is computed. The null hypothesis, 0H , is rejected if 
A
jT  is significant at any grid point. The SMM distribution with k and infinite degrees of 
freedom at the α% significance level, denoted by kM α,∞ , is used to control for the 
probability of rejecting the null hypothesis. The following decision rules are adopted 
based on a 1-α percentile of kM α,∞  tabulated by Stoline and Ury (1979): 







If ( ) for 1,..., ,  accept ;
if ( )  for all   and  ( ) for some ,   accept ;




A k A k
j i j i A
A k A k
j i j i A
A k
j i
T x M i k H
T x M i T x M i H













> , for some   and  ( ) for some ,   accept .
A k
j i Ai T x M i Hα∞− >
 (6) 
 Accepting either H0 or HA implies that no SD exists between the returns of any two 
assets, no arbitrage opportunity exists between these two assets, and neither of these two 
assets is preferred to the other. However, if 1AH  ( 2AH ) of order one is accepted, asset 
F ( G ) stochastically dominates G ( F ) at first order. From this perspective, an 
arbitrage opportunity exists and any non-satiated investor will be better off if he/she 
switches from the dominated asset to the dominant one. On the other hand, if 1AH  or 
2AH  is accepted for order two or three, a particular investment stochastically dominates 
the other at second or third order. In this situation, an arbitrage opportunity does not 
exist, and switching from one asset to another will increase only investors’ expected 
utilities but not their wealth (Jarrow, 1986; Falk and Levy 1989). 
 The DD test is designed to compare the distributions at a finite number of grid 
points. Too few grids will miss information of the distributions between any two 
consecutive grids (Barrett and Donald, 2003); however, too many grids will violate the 
independence assumption required by the SMM distribution (Richmond, 1982). Various 
studies examine the choice of grid points. For instance, Tse and Zhang (2004) show that 
an appropriate choice of k for reasonably large samples ranges from 6 to 15.  To make 
more detailed comparisons without violating the independence assumption, we follow 
Fong et al. (2005) and Gasbarro et al. (2007) to make 10 major partitions with 10 minor 
partitions within any two consecutive major partitions in each comparison and to make 
the statistical inference based on the SMM distribution for k =10 and infinite degrees of 
freedom.5 This allows us to examine the consistency of both magnitudes and signs of 
the DD statistics between any two consecutive major partitions. 
                                                        
5 Refer to Lean et al. (2006) for the reasoning. Critical values are 3.691, 3.254 and 3.043 for the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels of significance tabulated in Stoline and Ury (1979). 
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 Having stated the procedure for the ascending DD test statistics, we shall consider 
the order-j descending DD test for the risk-seekers. The order-j descending DD test 
statistic (which, in this paper, is also called the DD test statistic for the risk-seekers or 
DDDj), ( )DjT x  (j = 1, 2 and 3), is expressed by: 
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j j j
D D D D
j F G FGV x V x V x V x= + −  
1
1




















1 1ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( ) , , ; , ;
(( 1)!)









jD j D D
FG i i j j
i
V x h x H x H F G h y z
N N j









= − − = =⎢ ⎥−⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤




in which the integrals DjF  and 
D
jG  are defined as in (1) for 1, 2,3j = . The decision 
rules for risk-seekers can be obtained from modifying (6) as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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 As in the case of the test for the risk-averse, accepting either 0H  or DH  implies 
that no SD exists between F and G, no arbitrage opportunity exists between these two 
markets, and neither of these assets is preferred to the other. If 1DH  ( 2DH ) of order one 
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is accepted, asset F ( G ) stochastically dominates G ( F ) at first order. In this 
situation, an arbitrage opportunity exists, and any non-satiated investor will be better off 
if he/she switches from the dominated asset to the dominant one. On the other hand, if 
1DH  or 2DH  is accepted for order two or three, a particular asset stochastically 
dominates the other at second or third order. In this situation, an arbitrage opportunity 
does not exist, and switching from one asset to another will increase only the 
risk-seekers’ expected utility but their not wealth. 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 While we are primarily interested in the results of the SD test, for comparative 
purposes, we first apply the MV criterion and display a summary of its descriptive 
statistics of the data in this study in Table 1. All assets gain, on average, positive daily 
returns. The REITs and Treasury bill and Treasury note are statistically significant 
(greater than zero) but not the stock returns. The daily mean returns on REITs are 0.04% 
- 0.06%, much higher than the daily mean returns of other asset groups. Consistent with 
the common intuition, based on daily returns, REITs outperformed the stock indices and 
Treasury constant maturities for the period under study. However, the unreported 
pairwise t-tests show that only all REITs and equity REITs are significantly different 
from the S&P 500 and the two Treasury constant maturities at the 5% level. REITs also 
exhibit a smaller standard deviation than that of the three stock indices, but they have a 
larger standard deviation than the Treasury constant maturities. Applying the MV 
criterion, we find that all REITs (except mortgage REITs) dominate the three stock 
indices but not the Treasury constant maturities. Mortgage REITs dominate the 
NASDAQ only by the MV criterion.6      
           ---------------- 
Insert Table 1 
---------------- 
  As shown in Table 1, the highly significant Jarque-Bera statistics suggest that the 
                                                        
6 The statistics are available on request.  
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return distributions for all assets are non-normal. The evidence further indicates that all 
assets have significant skewness and kurtosis. REITs exhibit negative skewness, and 
mortgage REITs have a very high kurtosis (59.22). The exhibition of significant 
skewness and kurtosis further supports the non-normality of return distributions. 
Moreover, on the basis of the findings using the MV criterion, we cannot conclude 
whether investors’ preferences between assets will lead to an increase in wealth or, in 
the case of risk-averse or risk-seeking individuals, whether their preferences will 
increase their expected utility. However, the SD approach allows us to address the issue. 
To demonstrate the use of the SD approach, we first plot the cumulative distribution 
functions of returns on equity REITs and the S&P 500 in Figure 1 and plot the CDFs of 
returns on equity REITs and the 3-month Treasury bill in Figure 2 as examples. The 
plots show that there is no FASD between any two pairs of returns as their CDFs cross.7  
--------------------------- 
Insert Figs. 1 & 2  
--------------------------- 
 Figure 1 also shows the ascending DD statistics, AjT  (j = 1, 2, 3), over the entire 
distribution of returns for equity REITs and the S&P 500. This figure provides a visual 
representation of the DD test results. In particular, 1
AT  moves from negative to positive 
along the distribution of returns. This implies that equity REITs dominate the S&P 500 
in the downside risk (negative returns), while the S&P 500 dominates equity REITs in 
the upside profit (positive returns). To compare equity REITs with the 3-month Treasury 
bill, in Figure 2 we plot the ascending DD statistics for these two asset returns. The DD 
statistics show different movements from those in Figure 1. We find that equity REITs 
are dominated by the 3-month Treasury bill in the downside risk and the dominance 
order reverses in the upside profit. 
 However, the DD statistics could be significant or insignificant based on the critical 
values of SMM distributions. The rule set by the DD test states that the null hypothesis 
                                                        
7 The plots of other pairs also reveal no FASD. The results are available on request.  
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can be rejected if any of the t-statistics defined in (4) (or (5)) are significantly different 
from zero. To minimize the type II error of dominance and to accommodate the effect of 
almost SD (Leshno and Levy, 2002), we use a conservative 5% cut-off point for the 
proportion of t-statistics for statistical inference. Using a 5% cut-off point as a 
benchmark, for the risk-averse, if REITs dominate any of the other assets, we should 
find at least 5% significantly negative j-order ascending DD statistics, AjT , and no 
significantly positive AjT  statistics. The reverse holds if REITs are dominated by any of 
the other assets. On the other hand, for risk-seekers, if REITs dominate any of the other 
assets, we should find at least 5% significantly positive j-order descending DD 
statistics, DjT , and no significantly negative 
D
jT  statistics. The reverse holds if REITs 
are dominated by any of the other assets. 
---------------- 
Insert Table 2 
---------------- 
 Table 2 shows the results of the DD test for risk-averters for the entire period. There 
are four groups showing a pairwise comparison between four types of REITs and other 
assets.8 We take the pair of equity REITs and the S&P 500 as examples. The evidence 
from Table 2 suggests that 21% of 1
AT  is significantly negative, and 24% of 1
AT  is 
significantly positive for the risk-averse. This implies no FASD between the pair of 
equity REITs and the S&P 500. We find similar results for all the other pairs, such as 
equity REITs and Dow Jones Industrials and equity REITs and the NASDAQ.  
All 2
AT  and 3
AT  for the comparison of equity REITs and the S&P 500 are 
negative along the distribution of returns as shown in Figure 1. In addition, Table 2 
shows that 34% of 2
AT  and 58% of 3
AT  are found to be significantly negative at the 
5% level. Thus, we conclude that equity REITs dominate the S&P 500 at second and 
                                                        
8 The results of the comparison of other pairs are available on request.  
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third order under ASD, implying that any risk-averse investor would prefer equity 
REITs to the S&P 500 for maximizing utility. On the other hand, for the comparison of 
equity REITs and the 3-month Treasury bill (and 10-year Treasury note), we find that 
23% of 1
AT  is significantly negative and 32% of 1
AT  is significantly positive for 
risk-averters. Further inspecting the DD statistics for the second and third order for 
risk-averters, we see that the 3-month Treasury bill (10-year Treasury note) dominates 
equity REITs, since 34% of 2
AT  and 48% (50%) of 3
AT  are found to be significantly 
positive at the 5% level.  
 Overall, evidence derived from ascending DD statistics indicates there is no FASD 
between REITs and other assets, suggesting that investors cannot increase their wealth 
by switching from one asset to the other and there is no arbitrage opportunity between 
them (Bawa, 1978; Jarrow, 1986). These results are also evidence that we cannot reject 
market efficiency. However, by considering the statistics from SASD and TASD, we can 
determine whether investors could increase their expected utility by switching from one 
asset to another. In our research, it is apparent that risk-averters prefer REITs (except 
mortgage REITs) to stocks, while they prefer Treasury constant maturities over REITs 
for maximizing their expected utility. This implies that they will increase their expected 
utility by switching their investments from stocks to real estate and from real estate to 
fixed-income assets.  
--------------------------- 
Insert Figs. 3 & 4  
--------------------------- 
 Figures 3 and 4 present the cases for the descending CDF and the corresponding 
descending DD statistics for equity REITs and the S&P 500 and equity REITs and the 
3-month Treasury bill, respectively.  Specifically, Figure 3 reveals that the 1
DT  is 
negative in the upside return region and positive in the downside return region, 
revealing that the S&P 500 is preferred to equity REITs in the upper range of returns 
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and vice versa.   
  On the other hand, Figure 4 shows the descending CDF and the corresponding 
descending DD statistics for equity REITs and the 3-month Treasury bill, respectively. 
Figure 4 reveals that the 1
DT  is negative in the downside return region and positive in 
the upside return region. Putting the information together, it is clear that the 3-month 
Treasury bill is preferred to equity REITs in the lower range of returns and the reverse is 
true in the upper range based on FDSD. 
---------------- 
Insert Table 3 
---------------- 
 Table 3 reports the descending DD statistics for risk-seekers. As in Table 2, taking 
the comparison of equity REITs and the S&P 500 as an example, we find that 33% of 
2
DT  and 39% of 3
DT  are negative and statistically significant, respectively. Hence, 
risk-seeking investors will unambiguously prefer the S&P 500 to equity REITs to 
maximize their expected utility. On the other hand, if we compare equity REITs and the 
3-month Treasury bill, risk-seeking investors will prefer equity REITs to the 3-month 
Treasury bill as is evident from the fact that 45% of 2
DT  and 66% of 3
DT  are positive 
and statistically significant, respectively. Different from the evidence for risk-averters, 
evidence from second- and third-order DjT statistics reveals that risk-seekers will 
increase their expected utility by switching from real estate to stocks and from 
fixed-income assets to real estate.   
Is there time-varying behavior for risk-averters and risk-seekers? Dynamic asset 
price movements suggest that asset returns are subject to ongoing external shocks in 
addition to some big events and extraordinary economic/social disturbances. It is of 
interest to examine whether investors’ behavior is influenced by the up and down 
market trend. To address this issue, we divided the entire sample into two sub-periods.  
That is, we treat the period from January 1999 to December 2002 as an up market and 
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January 2003 to December 2005 as a down market. This allows us to investigate the 
behavioral differential conditioned on the financial economic environment.  
---------------- 
Insert Table 4 
---------------- 
The results for the two sub-periods are presented in Table 4. As we reported earlier, 
there is no FSD among all assets studied in this paper for each sub-period, implying that 
an arbitrage opportunity does not exist among these assets in both bull and bear 
markets. On the other hand, REITs are found to be dominated by Treasury constant 
maturities under ASD, while REITs dominate Treasury constant maturities under DSD 
in both sub-periods, indicating that investors’ behavior concerning fixed-income assets 
are not influenced by economic conditions. Nevertheless, we observe substantial 
differences among the distributions of other assets during different time periods. For 
instance, except for mortgage REITs, all other REITs are found to dominate stock 
indices under ASD in sub-period 1 but not in sub-period 2. For DSD, we find a change 
in direction of preference from sub-period 1 to sub-period 2. In particular, the S&P 500 
dominates equity REITs in sub-period 1; however, it is dominated by equity REITs in 
sub-period 2 under DSD, implying that investors’ behavior concerning stocks could be 
time-varying and influenced by market conditions. 
5. CONCLUSION 
 It is a widely accepted stylized fact that returns on most financial assets exhibit 
leptokurtosis and sometimes asymmetry and they are not normally distributed (Peiró, 
1999; Patton, 2004; Brooks, et al., 2005). The parametric analysis derived from the MV 
approach is likely to be misleading or of limited value. In addition, empirical findings 
using the MV approach cannot be used to decide whether investors’ portfolio 
preferences will increase wealth or, in the case of risk-averse investors, lead to an 
increase in utility without an increase in wealth. Given the limitation of the MV 
approach and the lack of a clear solution to the fat-tail distributions, this study is based 
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on the SD approach, which is not distribution-dependent, and can shed light on the 
utility and wealth implications of portfolio preferences by exploiting information 
obtained from higher order moments to test their performance. 
 By investigating the data on REITs and five other assets over the entire sample 
period of 1999–2005, we find that all REITs (except mortgage REITs) dominate the 
three stock indices but not the Treasury constant maturities using the MV criterion. We 
also find no FSD between them. This implies that investors cannot increase their wealth 
by switching from one asset to another. However, REITs (except mortgage REITs) 
stochastically dominate returns on the three stock indices but are stochastically 
dominated by fixed-income securities, the 3-month Treasury bill, and the 10-year 
Treasury bond at the second and third order for risk-averters. We find the reverse case 
for risk-seekers. This means that to maximize their expected utility, all risk-averse 
investors would prefer to invest in real estate than in the stock market, subject to trading 
costs. However, if we compare real estate to fixed-income assets, they would prefer 
fixed-income assets to real estate. On the other hand, all risk-seeking investors would 
prefer to invest in the stock market than in real estate (or in real estate rather than in 
fixed-income assets) to maximize their expected utility. In addition, we find that 
investors’ behavior concerning fixed-income assets is not influenced by economic 
conditions, while their behavior concerning stocks is time-varying and influenced by 
market conditions. 
 Last, we note that SD is found to be important in risk measurement, since the 
first-order SD is found to be equivalent to the value-at-risk, while the second-order SD 
is found to be equivalent to the conditional value-at-risk (Ogryczak and Ruszczyński, 
2002; Leitner, 2005; Ma and Wong, 2006). Thus, adopting SD for analysis will include 
inferences made by employing VaR and conditional VaR. We also note that if the 
prospects belong to the same local-scale family, the preference for the prospects drawn 
from the MV criterion will be the same as that drawn from the ascending SD criterion 
(Meyer, 1987; Wong and Ma, 2008). In addition, this paper extends the work on the SD 
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test from risk-averters to risk-seekers. Further research could include extending our 
work to test the SD theory for investors with S-shaped and reverse S-shaped utility 
functions as developed by Levy and Wiener (1998), Levy and Levy (2004), Wong and 
Chan (2008), among others. 
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Table 1. A Summary of Descriptive Statistics for Various Asset Returns (1999–2005) 
 
Asset Mean Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis J-B 
All REIT (ART) 0.05973*** 0.8168 -0.3653*** 3.8280*** 1154.88*** 
Equity REIT (ERT) 0.06148*** 0.8242 -0.3427*** 3.7216*** 1088.93*** 
Mortgage REIT (MRT) 0.06181* 1.4140 1.2879*** 59.217*** 267156*** 
US-DS Real Estate (DRE) 0.03554* 0.8860 -0.1792*** 3.2354*** 805.78*** 
Dow Jones Industrials (DJI) 0.01451 1.0998 0.1974*** 2.6265*** 536.40*** 
NASDAQ (NAS) 0.01927 1.9509 0.3173*** 3.5756*** 1002.80*** 
S&P 500 (SP5) 0.00741 1.1473 0.2208*** 2.0591*** 337.24*** 
10-Year T. Note (TB10) 0.01326*** 0.00218 0.4603*** -0.7526*** 107.52*** 
3-Month T. Bill (TB3) 0.008208*** 0.00477 0.3640*** -1.2980*** 168.53*** 
Notes: 
Skewness (SK) = E( 33, /) σµ−tiR , whereµ is the mean andσ is the standard deviation. Kurtosis (KUR) = 
E( 44, /) σµ−tiR .The asymptotic standard errors of SK and KUR are computed as (6/T)0.5 and (24/T)0.5, 
respectively. JB denotes Jarque-Bera statistic for testing normality defined by ]24/)3(6/[ 22 −+ KURSKT , 










Table 2: Results of DD Test for Risk-Averters (1999–2005)  
 FASD SASD TASD 
 % DD>0 % DD>CV % DD<0 % DD<CV % DD>0 % DD>CV % DD<0 % DD<CV % DD>0 % DD>CV % DD<0 % DD<CV 
ART - DJI 53 18 47 18 0 0 100 27 0 100 100 59 
ART - NAS 59 27 41 23 0 0 100 32 0 100 100 74 
ART - SP5 49 27 51 20 0 0 100 34 0 100 100 58 
ART - TB10 53 30 47 23 63 33 37 0 100 48 0 0 
ART - TB3 53 30 47 23 63 33 37 0 100 46 0 0 
ERT - DJI 52 17 48 17 0 0 100 27 0 0 100 59 
ERT - NAS 59 27 41 23 0 0 100 33 0 0 100 74 
ERT - SP5 49 24 51 21 0 0 100 34 0 0 100 58 
ERT - TB10 52 32 48 23 62 34 38 0 100 50 0 0 
ERT - TB3 52 32 48 23 61 34 39 0 100 48 0 0 
MRT - DJI 38 4 62 3 42 4 58 0 57 1 43 0 
MRT - NAS 47 13 53 10 29 1 71 12 35 1 65 19 
MRT - SP5 43 5 57 3 41 3 59 0 52 1 48 0 
MRT - TB10 41 12 59 10 46 11 54 0 92 15 8 0 
MRT - TB3 41 12 59 10 45 11 55 0 87 15 13 0 
DRE - DJI 54 9 46 15 0 0 100 20 0 0 100 28 
DRE - NAS 59 28 41 22 0 0 100 30 0 0 100 64 
DRE - SP5 54 21 46 18 2 0 98 25 1 0 99 45 
DRE - TB10 53 31 47 26 69 35 31 0 100 62 0 0 
DRE - TB3 53 31 47 26 67 35 33 0 100 59 0 0 
Notes: The table reports the percentages of positive and negative DD statistics, AjT  (see eqn (4) for j = 
1, 2, 3) for risk-averters, and their significant portions at the 5% significance level, based on the 
asymptotic critical value of 3.254 of the studentized maximum modulus (SMM) distribution.  
ERT is equity REIT, MRT is mortgage REIT, and DRE is US-DS Real Estate. 
ART - DJI means pairwise comparison of all REITs with the Dow Jones Industrial index. Other pairs are 
defined accordingly.  
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Table 3: Results of DD Test for Risk-Seekers (1999–2005) 
 FDSD SDSD TDSD 
 % DD>0 % DD>CV % DD<0 % DD<CV % DD>0 % DD>CV % DD<0 % DD<CV % DD>0 % DD>CV % DD<0 % DD<CV 
ART - DJI 41 18 59 18 38 0 62 25 0 0 100 31 
ART - NAS 41 23 59 27 27 0 73 30 0 0 100 47 
ART - SP5 39 20 61 27 41 0 59 33 0 0 100 41 
ART - TB10 47 23 53 30 100 40 0 0 100 67 0 0 
ART - TB3 47 23 53 30 100 44 0 0 100 67 0 0 
ERT - DJI 44 17 56 17 39 0 61 24 1 0 99 29 
ERT - NAS 41 24 59 27 27 0 73 30 0 0 100 47 
ERT - SP5 39 21 61 24 41 0 59 33 0 0 100 39 
ERT - TB10 48 23 52 32 100 41 0 0 100 66 0 0 
ERT - TB3 48 23 52 32 100 45 0 0 100 66 0 0 
MRT - DJI 62 3 38 4 100 3 0 0 100 0 0 0 
MRT - NAS 41 10 59 13 76 0 24 10 51 0 49 3 
MRT - SP5 56 3 44 5 100 1 0 0 100 0 0 0 
MRT - TB10 59 10 41 12 100 11 0 0 100 33 0 0 
MRT - TB3 59 10 41 12 100 12 0 0 100 36 0 0 
DRE - DJI 38 15 62 9 35 0 65 20 0 0 100 24 
DRE - NAS 35 18 65 21 38 0 62 28 0 0 100 34 
DRE - SP5 47 26 53 31 38 0 62 28 0 0 100 34 
DRE - TB10 47 26 53 31 100 33 0 0 100 68 0 0 
DRE - TB3 47 26 53 31 100 34 0 0 100 68 0 0 
Notes: The table reports the percentages of positive and negative DD statistics, DjT  (see eqn (7) for j = 
1, 2, 3) for risk-seekers and their significant portions at the 5% significance level, based on the asymptotic 
critical value of 3.254 of the studentized maximum modulus (SMM) distribution.  
ERT is equity REIT, MRT is mortgage REIT, and DRE is US-DS Real Estate. 
ART - DJI means pairwise comparison of all REITs with the Dow Jones Industrial index. Other pairs are 
defined accordingly.  
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Table 4: Results of DD Test for Sub-periods 
Sub-period 1 (1999 – 2002) Sub-period 2 (2003 - 2005) 
Risk-Averters Risk-Seekers Risk-Averters Risk-Seekers 
ART 2 DJI 
ART 2≺ DJI  ART / DJI  ART 2 DJI  
ART 2 NAS 
ART 2≺ NAS ART / NAS ART 2≺ NAS 
ART 2 SP5 
ART 2≺ SP5 ART / SP5 ART 2 SP5 
ART 2≺ TB10 
ART 2 TB10 ART 2≺ TB10 
ART 2 TB10 
ART 2≺ TB3 
ART 2 TB3 ART 2≺ TB3 
ART 2 TB3 
ERT 2 DJI  
ERT 2≺ DJI  ERT / DJI  ERT 2 DJI  
ERT 2 NAS 
ERT 2≺ NAS ERT / NAS ERT 2≺ NAS 
ERT 2 SP5 
ERT 2≺ SP5 ERT / SP5 ERT 2 SP5 
ERT 2≺ TB10 
ERT 2 TB10 ERT 2≺ TB10 
ERT 2 TB10 
ERT 2≺ TB3 
ERT 2 TB3 ERT 2≺ TB3 
ERT 2 TB3 
MRT / DJI  MRT / DJI  MRT 2≺ DJI  MRT 2 DJI  
MRT 2 NAS MRT 2≺ NAS MRT / NAS MRT / NAS 
MRT / SP5 MRT / SP5 MRT 2≺ SP5 MRT 2 SP5 
MRT 2≺ TB10 MRT 2 TB10 MRT 2≺ TB10 MRT 2 TB10 
MRT 2≺ TB3 MRT 2 TB3 MRT 2≺ TB3 MRT 2 TB3 
DRE 2 DJI  
DRE 2≺ DJI  DRE / DJI  DRE 2 DJI  
DRE 2 NAS 
DRE 2≺ NAS DRE / NAS DRE 2≺ NAS 
DRE 2 SP5 
DRE 2≺ SP5 DRE / SP5 DRE 2 SP5 
DRE 2≺ TB10 
DRE 2 TB10 DRE 2≺ TB10 
DRE 2 TB10 
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DRE 2≺ TB3 
DRE 2 TB3 DRE 2≺ TB3 
DRE 2 TB3 
 
Notes: ( )j jY Z≺ means Y dominates (is dominated by) Z under order-j ASD (refer to (2)) and 
( )j jY Z≺ means Y dominates (is dominated by) Z under order-j DSD (refer to (3)) respectively for j 
= 1, 2 and 3. Y / Z means no SD between Y and Z (refer to (5)).
































ADD2 ADD3 ADD1 S&P500 EREIT
 
Note: CDF is defined in (1) and the order-j DD Statistic, AjT  (ADDj), for risk-averters is defined in (4) 





































ADD2 ADD3 ADD1 TB3m EREIT
 
Note: CDF is defined in (1) and the order-j DD Statistic, AjT  (ADDj), for risk-averters is defined in (4) 









































DDD2 DDD3 DDD1 S&P500 EREIT
 
Note: Descending CDF is defined in (1) and the order-j DD Statistic, DjT  (DDDj), for risk-seekers is 






































DDD2 DDD3 DDD1 TB3m EREIT
 
Note: Descending CDF is defined in (1) and the order-j DD Statistic, DjT  (DDDj), for risk-seekers is 
defined in (7) for j = 1,2 and 3. 
 





EFFECTIVE BASEMETAL HEDGING: 












This study investigates optimal hedge ratios in all base metal markets. Using recent 
hedging computation techniques, we find that 1) the short-run optimal hedging ratio is 
increasing in hedging horizon, 2) that the long-term horizon limit to the optimal hedging 
ratio is not converging to one but is slightly higher for most of these markets, and 3) that 
hedging effectiveness is also increasing in hedging horizon. When hedging with futures 
in these markets, one should hedge long-term at about 6 to 8 weeks with a slightly greater 
than one hedge ratio. These results are of interest to many purchasing departments and 
other commodity hedgers. 




Hedging is considered an integral part of a competitive and successful commodity 
purchasing department.  With raw material demand rising globally the strategic 
importance of hedging has never been as critical as it is today.  Volatility in commodity 
markets continues to increase because of 1) political uncertainty and natural disasters, 2) 
the expanding global nature of trade and the resulting soaring demands from remote 
markets, and 3) a corresponding shift in manufacturing capacity as more product flow 
into the U.S. from abroad (Dickson et al. (2006)). Due to the increased volatility in 
commodity markets and strengthened global competition, companies can no longer rely 
on traditional approaches, such as strategic sourcing and volume aggregation, to manage 
their purchasing needs. Multinational firms no longer compete “…by exploiting scale and 
scope economies or by taking advantage of imperfections in the world’s goods, labor, and 
capital markets” (Hansen and Nohria (2004)).  Firms must rely more than before on risk 
management techniques to manage their materials exposure. These techniques include, 
but are not limited to, eliminating cost inefficiencies in operations, hedging commodity 
price risk with financial derivatives, and altering hedging horizons. 
 
Our study concentrates on optimal hedging ratios and horizons in the metals 
markets.  Our results show that 1) the short-run optimal hedging ratio is increasing in 
hedging horizon, 2) the long-term horizon limit to the optimal hedging ratio is not 
converging to one but is slightly higher for most of these markets, and 3) hedging 
effectiveness is also increasing in hedging horizon. The best hedging decision for these 
markets is to hedge long-term at about 6 to 8 weeks with a slightly greater than one hedge 




ratio. These findings provide insights and a better understanding of the characteristics and 
properties that shape the effectiveness of futures commodity trading, insights that are 
valuable and relevant to the general commodity hedger. 
 
In 2003, a survey taken as part of the Corporate Executive Board Procurement 
Strategy Council (2003) revealed that 41% of risk managers believe that their 
procurement department will become significantly more important in the coming years 
and, critically, over 50% acknowledge that the effectiveness of their procurement 
organization’s risk management division needs significant improvement. In fact, these 
managers ranked commodity price risk as more relevant than currency price risk by a 3 to 
2 ratio. Consequently, it is no surprise that hedging demand in the metals markets is such 
that, over the period from Jan-June 2005 to Jan-June 2006, non-precious metals futures 
trading increased by 21% in volume and the volume for aluminum contracts alone 
increased by 32% (Holz (2006)). Wall Street is responding to the demand by hiring more 
traders and new product developers. Barclays aims to hire 20% more staff in 2007 after it 
already increased staff by 35% the previous year (Freed (2007)). Market demand 
projections see no end to this trend. In the aluminum market, demand is projected to grow 
by 9.4% in 2007, following on the 2006 8% growth. This matches unfavorably with the 
projections in supply. The International Primary Aluminum Institute forecasts an increase 
in production in 2007 of 6.5% and an increase in 2008 of 3.4%. While metals producers 
can expect profitable years, metal consumers are faced with difficult choices and reduced 
profitability.  Market conditions point to the need for a concerted risk management policy 
at the corporate level. 




The hedging literature is vast and covers both the motives for hedging and the 
strategies used to address these motives. For the current study, it is important to recall 
two areas of the literature. First, one branch of the literature aims to justify the use of 
hedging by procurement divisions (Froot et al (1993), Hansen and Nohria (2004), 
Koppenhaver and Swidler (1996)), while the second helps determine how best to select 
optimal futures positions that minimize the risk inherent in the spot (cash) market 
(chronologically, Fletcher and Ward (1971), Benninga et al (1984), Perron (1989), Baillie 
and Meyers (1990), Chowdhury (1991), Lien and Luo (1993), Geppert (1995), Alexander 
(1999), Chen, Lee and Shrestha (2004)).  This study is an investigation into the optimal 
hedge ratio and hedging effectiveness for base metals. 
 
Hedging in futures markets involves taking a futures position opposite to that of a 
spot market position (Institute for Financial Markets (1998)).  For commodity purchasing 
departments, the futures markets effectively represent a pricing mechanism in the 
commodity purchasing process.  One common definition of the optimal hedge ratio is 
“…the ratio of the covariance between spot and futures prices to the variance of the 
futures price” (Myers and Thompson (1989)).  Intuitively, the optimal hedge ratio defines 
the futures market position that will simultaneously minimize the risk absorbed in the 
spot market or, plainly, what amount of the commodity should be hedged with futures.  
We also look specifically at the hedging horizon, as previously studied by Chen, Lee, and 
Shrestha (CLS) (2004) using cointegration to estimate the optimal hedge ratio, to 
determine whether hedging effectiveness improves across greater hedging time horizons. 




This study analyzes the six base metals traded on the London Metal Exchange 
(LME): aluminum, copper, lead, nickel, tin, and zinc.  The use of LME base metals is 
beneficial given its global acceptance as the world’s leader in metal futures trading.  It is 
also interesting to study these futures and their respective hedging effectiveness given 
their dramatic upswing in volatility over the past few years: the six base metals 
volatilities increased by 174% on average.  
 
The paper first presents a review of the academic literature then Section III 
presents the empirical questions. In Section IV, we present the data and the methodology. 
Section V reports the results and we conclude in Section VI. 
    
II. LITERATUTE REVIEW 
Our study builds on the last 25 years of the optimal hedge ratio literature. Our 
empirical models for estimation are based on the body of research that started with 
Ederington in 1979.  This research area evolved through three phases. First and notably, 
Ederington (1979) established the first empirical models; later more sophisticated 
techniques of GARCH estimation were applied, and most recently approaches of 
cointegration have been used. 
 
Ederington (1979) is the first to empirically estimate optimal hedge ratios and is 
accordingly credited with formulating the theoretical framework. Ederington summarizes 
the three working theories of hedging at the time: 1) Traditional Theory, 2) Theories of 
Holbrook Working, and 3) the Portfolio Theory.  He finds fault with Traditional Theory, 




the leading theory at the time. Ederington challenges its convenient yet unrealistic 
assumption that a change in futures price is exactly proportionate to a change in cash 
prices.  Ederington argues that the theories of Holbrook Working improve on the inherent 
weakness of the Traditional Theory by bringing light to the fact that most hedgers do 
account for the dynamic information the cash-futures basis provides at the time the hedge 
is placed.  Still, the study argues that a more realistic approach is to view hedging in a 
risk and return framework best formulated by an approach that combines Portfolio 
Theory and Working’s Theory.  This provides rationale as to why a hedger may at 
different times be either hedged or completely un-hedged. 
 
Ederington’s seminal contribution to the optimal hedge ratio literature is the 
empirical finding that even pure risk minimizers will hedge less than their spot market 
requirements which is contrary to the findings of preceding research.  Moreover, he finds 
that hedging effectiveness improves across two time horizons for financial security 
futures.  Specifically, his findings show that the futures markets for two financial 
securities prove to be more effective hedging instruments over longer periods.  However, 
the limitation of only using two time horizons, along with the arbitrary method of 
defining a long period as four weeks and a short period as one week, jeopardizes the 
applicability of Ederington’s conclusions.  Furthermore, the study assumes that the 
minimum variance hedge ratio is simultaneously the optimal hedge ratio without formally 
proving or interpreting this relationship.  A second related weakness lies in the 
assumption that a hedger who maximizes profit will simultaneously be minimizing the 
variance of the hedge. 




In consideration of these limitations, several important studies quickly addressed 
these concerns.  Benninga, Eldor, and Zilcha (1984) respond first, finding fault in the 
latter of the two weaknesses.  Benninga et al. (1984) find that assuming a hedger has a 
quadratic utility function presents ‘undesirable properties’ for estimation and also point 
out that the assumption that the minimization of producer income variance is equivalent 
to the optimal hedge ratio is theoretically inappropriate.  Instead, Benninga et al. do prove 
that, in unbiased futures markets, the minimization of income variance is equivalent to 
the optimal hedge ratio.  
 
Benninga et al. make two assumptions: 1) the futures price is an unbiased 
predictor of the future spot price, [F0=E0(F1)=E0(P2)], and 2) the regressibility of spot 
prices on futures price, [P1= α + βF1 + ε] where ε is homoscedastic.  F0 represents the 
futures price at t=0, F1 represents the futures price at t=1, and P2  represents the spot price 
at t=2.  Therefore, both F1 and P2 are unknown prices that the producer faces in everyday 
hedging decisions.    In unbiased markets, the only reason for the producer to hedge is to 
minimize risk, given that on average there will be little to gain in an unbiased market.  
Therefore, the optimal hedge is where X=βQ with Q representing the quantity required in 
the spot market and X representing the optimal amount hedged on the futures market.  
Assumption 2 may be econometrically troublesome since the use of price levels can lead 
to autocorrelation with the residuals.  Therefore, using price changes, [(P1 - P0) = α + 
β(F1 - F0) + ε] rids the model of autocorrelation. This model still yields the optimal hedge 
ratio under the assumption of unbiased futures markets.  The only uncertainty remaining 
in the producer’s expected income is the residual and the regression coefficient, β, is the 




minimum variance hedge ratio.  The strength of their results “…derives from its 
generality (it is free from assumptions about utility functions) and from the ease of its 
applicability (it requires only a regression analysis to derive the optimal hedge ratio)” 
(Benninga et al (1984)). 
 
Following the research by Benninga et al (1984), the empirical estimation of the 
optimal hedge ratio was improved by accounting for cointegration between spot and 
futures prices.  One of the key findings is that spot and futures prices tend to drift 
together over time.  Chowdhury (1991) proves that “…the market efficiency hypothesis 
requires that the current futures price and the future spot price of a commodity are close 
together.”  This follows from the definition of market efficiency which implies that 
current prices should reflect all current and past price information in establishing current 
market prices.  Chowdhury uses price data from the LME to test the hypothesis of market 
efficiency (cointegration) for copper, lead, tin, and zinc.1  Cointegration is found between 
the four base metals studied suggesting that the use of conventional estimation techniques 
to estimate the optimal hedge ratio would lead to over-hedging.  A model that fails to 
incorporate the long run co-movement between variables does not capture the mean 
reverting tendency of the model, which leads to an upward bias in the point estimates in 
the model. 
 
                                                 
1 Base metals are some of the most commonly traded futures contracts, yet this is the only study to 
incorporate base metals in the optimal hedge ratio analysis.  It should be noted that the Chowdhury study 
does not give any attention to hedging strategy, paying all of its attention to the statistical properties of 
cointegration. 




Lien and Luo (1993) address the problem of over-hedging by estimating the 
optimal hedge ratio using an error correction model to account for the issue of 
cointegration the Chowdhury study raises.  Lien and Luo run their estimation at 9 
hedging horizons and find that the optimal hedge ratio tends to fluctuate before 
converging towards one suggesting that the optimal hedge ratio converges to the naïve 
hedge ratio over time.  These findings were later augmented by Geppert (1995), who 
establishes that hedging effectiveness and the optimal hedge ratio both depend on the 
permanent and transitory components of the price changes between spot and futures 
prices.  “Over long horizons, the shared component ties the spot and futures series 
together and the two prices will be perfectly correlated” (Geppert (1995)). A major 
weakness in the Geppert study is the model requirement that both spot and futures prices 
be I(1) to implement the Stock and Watson (1988) methodology suggested in the study.  
It would be useful to adopt a methodology that provides valid hedge ratios when the unit-
root condition is not satisfied. 
Such a study is Chen, Lee and Shrestha (CLS) (2004). CLS empirically estimate 
the optimal hedge ratio with a cointegration methodology that does not require both the 
spot and futures prices to contain a single unit root.  They are able to estimate both the 
short-run and long-run hedge ratios with the Pesaran et al (2001) approach that does not 
require both series to be I(1) or I(2) together.  This approach works when prices are unit 
root processes and when they are stationary.  In all, 9 different hedging horizons are 
considered over 25 different commodities. As expected, they find that the futures and 
spot prices share a stochastic trend implied theoretically by market efficiency and the no-
arbitrage condition.  In estimating the optimal hedge ratios they find that hedging 




effectiveness does improve over greater hedging horizons and that the short-run hedge 
ratio is significantly less than one.  Our study of the six LME metals follows the CLS 
methodology. 
 
III. EMPIRICAL QUESTIONS 
In principle, futures markets exist to offer buyers and sellers of the underlying 
commodities, financial instruments, or index the opportunity to minimize the price risk 
inherent in cash market positions.  These open markets allow for better price discovery. 
Moreover, futures markets are appealing to firms because of high liquidity and ease of 
entry/exit properties.  Various businesses across the globe utilize these advantageous 
properties to manage price risk exposure.  This translates to firm cost savings as they 
mitigate their risk exposure.  Firms especially adept at risk management will likely 
survive periods of high price risk and volatility.  Given the recent competitive nature of 
the commodity landscape, firms are implementing and plan to implement multitudes of 
hedging strategies to trim the costs of elevated commodity prices.   
 
In commodity purchases, hedging using futures contracts can be thought of as 
offsetting the risk imposed by a firm’s commodity requirements.  A firm that requires a 
fixed amount of copper in the production of their good would want to offset their market 
price risk by buying copper futures against their annual requirements.  Under a futures 
contract, the price is set for delivery at a future date.  Therefore, if the trader is 
anticipating a bullish copper market, she would be wise to assume a long position defined 




as buying deferred month futures contracts. This allows the trader to realize this gain in 
futures prices which would alleviate the upside price risk in the spot market. 
 
 Hedging price risk involves not only when to be short and when to be long but it 
also requires a thorough understanding of the long-run relationship between the spot and 
futures markets.  This may be the most important element in an efficient commodity 
purchasing department because it ultimately reveals how effective a department is at 
using the price discovery relationship in formulating hedging strategies.  The price 
discovery relationship implies that spot and futures share a long-run stochastic trend; 
thus, an effective hedging department would understand that over longer hedging 
horizons prices tend to revert to the mean together.  For these reasons, the hedging 
horizon is the key issue being addressed in this research.  Given the volatile and upward 
trending data employed in this study, it seems appropriate to hypothesize that the hedging 
effectiveness of a firm with a comparatively longer hedging horizon would be much more 
effective in minimizing risk over our data period.  The current research consensus is that 
spot and futures markets move together over long horizons.  This implies that a firm 
facing adverse upside price risk would be wise in lengthening their hedging horizon to 
offset the unfavorable prospect of increasing spot market prices. 
Let us look at a trading scenario in the aluminum futures market to emphasize the 
importance of effective risk management. Consider major American beverage industry 
players such as Pepsi-Cola Co., Anheuser-Busch Inc., Miller Brewing Co., and Coca-
Cola Co. All of these firms have significant annual aluminum requirements.  
Correspondingly, all these companies assume a long position in the futures markets 










Actual Aluminum Market Timeline 
$1,357 
Actual Aluminum Market Time Spread 
because they are always in demand of (buying) aluminum to package their respective 
products.  Aluminum has recently experienced a 41% increase in its mean historical 
futures price.  Likewise, the spot market prices followed this trend but in an often erratic 
and unpredictable fashion.  This naturally introduced a considerable amount of basis risk, 
making the hedging decisions by commodity traders within these companies difficult at 
best.  Basis risk is the unexpected fluctuations in the prices of cash and futures that is a 
product of influences ranging from seasonality to supply disruptions.  All of these firms 
likely would have endured this period unsuccessfully without the use of some form of 
hedging strategy. 
Consider a beverage company, similar to one of the firms mentioned above, with 
an annual and realistic aluminum requirement of 100,000 metric tons (MT).  The 
standard aluminum contract is specified for 25 MT at some point in time for future 
delivery.  Now, consider the price of $1,322 for cash aluminum in October of 1998 and 
compare it to the prices prevailing in May of 2000.  
 




 The market in October was in contango as indicated by the futures price being 
greater than that of the market.  Therefore, pursuing the recommended strategy above 
would lead to hedging the spot market position of 100,000 MT.  This strategy would lock 
in the price of $1,357/MT on October of 1998 for delivery in May 2000.  Assuming away 
transaction costs, this simple hedging strategy would save the hypothetical firm $14M 
dollars (= (1,498-1,357) * 100,000).  The questions a commodity hedger has to answer 
before implementing her strategies include: what is the best hedge ratio and what is the 
best time horizon for this hedge? Our methodology allows us to answer these two 
questions. 
 
IV. ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY 
Table 1 shows the six metals markets our data set covers. All these metals are 
traded on the London Metal Exchange: Aluminum, Copper, Lead, Nickel, Tin, and Zinc.  
Our dataset is longer than those in previous studies and provides the daily close price for 
both the cash and futures prices dating back to July of 1998 and up to October 2006.  The 
futures data is collected from Futuresource, a database specifically designed for 
commodity traders.  The futures price data represent the near-by futures contract or the 
contract with the closest settlement date and rolled over 10 days prior to expiration. Cash 
prices used are very closely related to the second bell close on the LME, since nearly all 
metals pricing is based on this quote. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 




Table 2 illustrates the recent increased volatility in the metal markets: the price 
standard deviation increased across the six metals by an average of 174%.  The table also 
reports the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean price to indicate how volatility 
increased in proportion to the average price for all six of the base metals.  This statistic 
indicates that both mean prices and standard deviation increased over the period. Figure 1 
illustrates the increased volatility prevailing in the current commodity landscape.  The 
figure shows the dramatic upward shift in prices that has occurred in all six of the 
contacts over the last two years of our sample.  We observe that mean aluminum futures 
prices increase over 41% after the break point in March 2005, with a record high being 
reached on May 11, 2006.  Copper provides a similar story, but the mean futures prices 
more than doubles (137%) with a record high also being reached on May 11.  The copper 
contract is usually regarded as the leading base metal, primarily because of its large 
trading volume, which helps explain the contract’s significant uptrend in comparison to 
aluminum, lead, nickel, and tin. Finally, Panel A illustrates the increase of futures prices 
in the zinc market of over 100%. Lead’s historical prices reached a record high on 
October 16 and the mean futures price increasing over 77%.  Nickel’s price path parallels 
that of copper with its price more than doubling (124%).  Again, the record high was 
established on October 16.  Tin increases modestly in comparison to Lead and Nickel 
with a much less dramatic increase of 51% with a record high being set on October 16. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 





Empirically, the estimation follows the derivation provided by Benninga et al. 
(1984). First, let’s assume that a commodity purchasing department for a beverage 
company has to buy some quantity (Q) of aluminum at t=1.  The price (P1) at period t=1 
is uncertain since one is unable to predict future prices.  The commodity trader can 
purchase futures (F0) at t=0 to offset the uncertainty of the price (P1) at t=1.  The income 
of the firm after implementing the hedge is, therefore, represented in equation (1) below, 
QP1 + X(F0 – F1) (1) 
where F1 represents the futures price at t=1 and X represents the trader’s hedge.  
In this case, the quantity X represents a long position in the futures market and the 
difference in the two futures prices will establish whether the hedge was favorable. 
 
In order to derive the optimal hedge ratio, one must assume that the futures 
market is an unbiased predictor (market efficiency) of the spot market which is denoted 
below in equation (2).  This assumption is not unrealistic given the wide body of research 
on cointegration that indicates that futures and spot prices do share a mean-reverting 
relationship in the long run (Lien and Luo (1993), Geppert (1995), Alexander (1999), 
CLS (2004)).  It is also assumed that the spot price shares a linear relationship with the 
futures market or that spot prices can be regressed on futures prices.  This holds if ε, the 
error term, is not correlated with F1 (Benninga et al (1984)).  
F0=E0(F1)=E0(P2) (2) 
P1 =  α + β F1 + ε (3) 




  Subsequently, the variables are differenced to rid the model of this inherent 
problem as illustrated below in equation (4).  All the assumptions still hold if equation (4) 
is estimated in favor of equation (3). 
(P1 – P0) = α + β (F1 – F0) + ε (4) 
Equation (5) replicates equation (1) but in this case the dependent variable is 
included to capture the income of the firm after the hedge is completed.  
I = QP1 + X*(F0 – F1) (5) 
The expected income of the firm is found to equal the cost of the spot market 
requirement under the unbiasedness assumption in equation (2).  This relationship is 
denoted below in equation (6), where the two futures prices cancel out under the 
assumption of unbiasedness.  The only reason remaining to hedge is to minimize the risk 
that the commodity poses.  
E0(I) = Q*E0(P1) + X*(F0 – E0(F1)) = Q*E0(P1) (6) 
 
If the commodity trader allows his hedge position to equal the product of the 
coefficient in the regression equation (β) with the physical requirement of the commodity 
(Q) then equation (7) below follows.  This is the result of substituting (β * Q) for X in 
equation (5). 
I = Q (P1 - β F1) + Q β F0 (7) 
Solving equation (3) for (P1 - β F1) allows the substitution of (α + ε) into equation 
(8) below: 
I = Q (α + ε) + Q β F0 (8) 




Equation (8) proves that the optimal hedge ratio is X = (Q β) and it indicates that 
the only remaining uncertainty in the equation is in the error term which, by definition, 
cannot be hedged.  Therefore, all income variance is eliminated and the only reason for 
the trader to hedge is to minimize the risk variance captured by (Q β).  This finding 
proves that the minimum variance hedge ratio is also the optimal hedge ratio.  
Equation (9) represents the minimum variance hedge ratio defined by Ederington 
(1979) when the trader/producer is attempting to minimize income variance.    
Var I = Q2 Var P1 + X2 Var F1 – 2 Q X Cov (P1 , F1) (9) 
 The minimum variance hedge can also be represented as equation (10) below with 
the use of simple differentiation: 
X = Q Cov (P1 , F1) / Var F1 (10) 
  Note that X/Q is equivalent to β, the coefficient representing the hedge ratio in 
equation (4), which is also equivalent to the expression Cov (P1 , F1) / Var F1.   
 Given this proof, it is theoretically valid to empirically estimate the optimal hedge 
ratio with the differenced form equation (4) above.  Before estimating this model, it needs 
to be addressed how the optimal hedge ratio will be estimated for the different hedging 
horizons.  These estimation techniques are produced in the studies by Geppert (1995) and 
CLS (2004).  Both studies prove that the price changes (∆Pt and ∆Ft) in equation (4) 
should be k-period differenced to properly estimate a respective k-period hedging horizon 
optimal hedge ratio.  Simply put, this means that the frequency of the data must match the 
hedging horizon of the estimated optimal hedge ratio.  A major drawback in the Geppert 
study is the use of overlapping differencing to prevent the sample size from becoming too 




small.  As CLS points out, such a method produces correlated observations which lead to 
a regression that has autocorrelated error terms.  This should be avoided to eliminate the 
upward bias in estimates of the statistical significance of coefficient estimates.  The 
sample size in the present study is large enough to warrant the use of non-overlapping 
differences which prevents the troublesome properties of autocorrelated error terms 
produced by overlapping differencing. 
 
The next step in the methodology is to test for unit root in the prices for both the 
spot and futures in all six of the base metals.  This is necessary because, as market 
efficiency implies, futures and spot prices should move together over time.  Under market 
efficiency, if the futures move in one direction then so do the spot prices, implying that if 
both series are I(1) then they also should be cointegrated.  Perron (1989) unit root tests 
are performed to account for the breaks in the data that are quite obvious when visually 
examining Figures 1-6.  This method tests for stationarity after detrending the series and 
allowing for structural breaks.  The structural breaks in this test should be exogenous.  
This is easily supported in the base metals as speculative hedge funds have increasingly 
emerged in commodity markets to create more balanced portfolios.  This phenomenon 
has coincided with the price increases outlined in Figures 1-6 and would be difficult to 
conceive as anything but exogenous in the causality of futures prices.  Detrending the 
series using both slope and intercept shifts are employed after several updates to the study 
have shown this method to be preferred (Pesaran (1997)).  Choosing the break points for 
these tests is done by visually examining the data to determine the break in the data 
which is used in estimating the test statistic. 





After the unit root tests are performed, it is necessary to evaluate whether 
cointegration exists among the prices of both the futures and spot markets.  Again, market 
efficiency implies that this is the case.  CLS only assumes cointegration so this study 
improves upon this by empirically verifying the long-run co-movement.  Cointegration is 
tested using the Pesaran et al method (2001) which transforms equation (4) into the 
unconstrained version of the error-correction model denoted by equation (11) below: 
∆Pt =  α - β 1∆Ft-1 – β 2 ∆Ft-2 + β 3∆Pt-1 + β 4∆Pt-2 + Φ1 Ft-1 + Φ2 Pt-1 + εt (11) 
In (11), two lags are included for the purpose of uniformity but in the actual 
estimation of the test, lags will be determined with the Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC) model selection test.  The Pesaran approach uses an F-statistic to test whether the 
lagged level variables are jointly significant [Φ1= Φ2=0]. Critical values for these tests are 
obtained from the study by Pesaran et al (2001).  These tests are performed with the 
weekly data that are also used in the unit root tests. 
After testing for cointegration, the simultaneous equation models considered by 
Pesaran (1997) in equation (8) of that study is adapted to jointly estimate the ratios, 
which allow us to evaluate the long-run relationship that exists between spot and futures 
prices enabling a dynamic model that corrects short-run deviations from the long-run 
equilibrium (Alexander (1999).  Equation (12) is “…parameterized so as to be closely 
associated with the error-correction models encountered in the vector autoregressive 
models with cointegration” CLS (2004): 
(P1 – P0) = α1 + α2Pt-1 + α3Ft-1 + β (F1 – F0) + ε (12) 




This equation differs from the error correction model in that ∆Ft is used instead of 
the ∆Ft-1 term that the vector autoregressive model yields.  This alteration is supported 
theoretically in the CLS study which uses ∆Ft because it explicitly represents the short-
run hedge ratio.  Additionally, a simultaneous equations approach is avoided because the 
interest lies only in the short-run and long-run ratios.  In equation (12) both the short-run 
and long-run hedge ratios can be estimated where - α3 / α2 is the long-run hedge ratio, as 
proved by Geppert, and β is the short-run hedge ratio.  This eliminates the problem 
associated with equation (4) only incorporating short-run information.  It is anticipated 
that the long-run hedge ratio will remain constant and that the short-run ratio will 
converge to the long-run ratio across greater time horizons.  Equation (12) is supported 
theoretically by CLS and adapted from Pesaran et al. 
 
The final and most important step in the methodology involves testing the out-of-
sample hedging effectiveness.  Out-of-sample hedging effectiveness will enable the 
researcher to evaluate how effective the hedging strategy is over increasing hedging 
horizons.  Using equation (13) as the hedged portfolio, hedging effectiveness will be 
determined by equation (14) which frequently serves as a measure of hedging 
effectiveness in the body of research on optimal hedge estimation (see among others, 
Anderson and Danthine (1981) or Meyers and Thompson (1989)): 
∆Vh = Q (∆Pt ) + X(∆Ft) (13) 
1 – [Var(∆Vh) / Var (∆Pt)] (14) 
The first half of the sample will be utilized to compute the optimal hedge ratio 
across all of the hedging horizons with these estimated hedge ratios being substituted for 




X in equation (13).  Furthermore, the second half of the data set will be used in 
calculating the remainder of the coefficients with Q being set to 1.  Ultimately, this 
equation represents the amount of variance reduced with the implementation of the hedge 
above and beyond that of an unhedged position.  
 
V. RESULTS 
The first part of the methodology involves testing for unit root or the stationarity 
of the variables.  Table 3 shows the results of the unit root tests conducted on the weekly 
data for each market.  All the variables except for the futures prices on zinc appear to be 
I(1) or integrated of order 1.  The λ represents the proportion of the sample at which the 
break point occurs, measured from the beginning of the data sample to the breaks, which 
are determined visually.2 The finding on zinc might be attributed to the low power of unit 
root tests.  In any case, the test statistic is close to passing the test and would 
hypothetically pass at the 12% level of significance.  The DF-GLS test was also used to 
provide further insight into the results, and the finding from this test shows that zinc does 
in fact have unit root.   These findings coupled together point to zinc futures being I(1).  
The fact that the cash prices have unit root suggests the futures should as well, given the 
no-arbitrage condition and market efficiency condition assumed in the literature (CLS 
(2004)).  Therefore, all prices are assumed to suffer from unit root. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
                                                 
2 A range of possible break points were selected including the minimum, mean, and maximum.  All three of 
these were tested with their respective lambda statistic and all proved to change the results very little.  Also, 
the test statistics were calibrated as needed to more appropriately capture a break that falls between the 
values offered in the study.  These were altered approximately 0.75 for each incremental move away from 
the lambda statistic to produce more reliable estimates.  





Given that all the variables appear to be integrated of order 1, the optimal hedge 
ratios are calculated for 9 hedging horizons ranging from one day, one week to eight 
weeks. The results are reported in Table 4.  All the estimates in Table 4 prove to be 
significant at the 1% level of significance.  Estimation of the ratios is performed using 
simple OLS from equation (4).  The variables are differenced to account for unit root and 
autocorrelation.  Ultimately, all the optimal hedge ratios do not converge towards one 
across greater hedging horizons.  Many of them do appear to fluctuate across the horizons 
but each of the markets exhibit a distinct trend (except aluminum) towards a value greater 
than one.  The very short horizon (one-day) optimal hedge ratios are all less than 0.65 
but, as soon as the differentiation frequency is increased to 1-week, the optimal ratio 
increase to a range from 0.83 (Tin) to 0.99 (Nickel). The ratio at the 4-week horizon are 
all greater than 1, ranging from 1.00 (Aluminum and Copper) to 1.11 (Nickel). At the 
longest time horizon we study, the optimal ratios range from 1.00 (Aluminum) to 1.17 
(Nickel). Overall, the average (median) 8-week hedging horizon across the six metals is 
roughly 1.074 (1.066).  Empirically, this means that the trader should be hedged 7.4% 
above the respective spot position.  This finding is contrary to the findings of CLS and 
Geppert who both found that the optimal hedge ratio converges to one across greater time 
horizons.  Table 4 suggests that, in general, the proportion of spot positions to be covered 
by opposite positions on futures markets is greater than one.  This finding is of 
importance, but at this point, should be considered preliminary since the I(1) prices in this 
study are assumed to trend together over time which can lead to misleading results in an 
OLS regression (Chowdhury (1991)). 





[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
 
Given that all the variables in the model contain unit root, it is anticipated that all 
the relationships between spot and futures prices share a long-run stochastic trend.  Table 
5 verifies that each of the 6 markets studied do share a mean-reverting relationship, as in 
each case the test statistic is greater than the upper I(1) bound found in the Pesaran study.  
The test employed here has two variables (k), an intercept, and no trend.  The 10% 
critical value is 4.14 in this case, which means that for the series to be cointegrated the 
test statistic must be greater than the 4.14 test statistic.  The use of this test improves on 
several earlier studies that used the Engle-Granger method.  Using this test takes 
advantage of the minimum variance criterion used in the test that is also used in the risk 
management application of this study (Alexander (1999)).  These tests were reinforced 
with the Engle-Granger test that provided the same conclusions as the Pesaran approach. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
 
Having confirmed that all the variables within each respective market are 
cointegrated, the associated joint estimation that ties this long-run co-movement together 
is performed.  The estimation approach is CLS’s which jointly estimates the long-run and 
short-run hedge ratios.  Table 6 presents the result from this approach and it is apparent 
that the results are very similar to that of the previous short-run estimation.  This 
estimation, which correctly includes the long-run properties of the cash-futures 




relationship, should account for the concerns associated with the estimation of equation 
(4).  Correcting for cointegration issues, the results in Table 6 tend to bear out that the 
naïve estimation of equation (4) leads to over-estimation of the optimal hedge ratio. At 
the 8-week horizon, the optimal hedge ratio in Table 6 is lower than that in Table 4 for 4 
of the 6 metal markets, namely aluminum, lead, nickel and zinc. Nonetheless, the results 
in Table 6 confirm that, after controlling for cointegration issues, the hedgers should have 
been overhedged to minimize the variance of their cash position.  Namely, market 
participants should, across the six metals on average, overhedge by 6.7% at the 8-week 
hedging horizon.  One may question whether 7.4% and 6.7% are really different from one 
another.  However, using the hypothetical aluminum requirement of 100,000 MT used in 
Section III as a benchmark, the two different hedge ratios account for a $1.9M difference 
when employing the two hedge ratio values.  Any firm would be more than glad to add 
this additional cost avoidance to their portfolio. Again, these findings are indicative of the 
volatile commodity landscape that has taken form over the recent years. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
 
The study by CLS points out that the short-run hedge ratio should approach the 
long-run hedge in this joint estimation.  Table 6 provides confirmation of this fact. First, 
as one can anticipate, at the one day horizon, the two estimates are very different. The 
average value of the percentage difference between the two estimates, measured as 
(Short-run ratio – Long-run ratio) / Long-run ratio, is a high -41%. At the one-week 
horizon, the difference is already greatly reduced to -7.6% and is further reduced at the 2-




week horizon to -2.7%. Aggregating all other horizons reported in Table 6, the difference 
narrows to an average 0.1% confirming the convergence but we should note that the sign 
of this difference is not consistent either across horizon or across markets. 
Finally, Table 7 presents the findings of how effective these optimal hedge ratios 
would be in a portfolio consisting of cash and futures positions.  All the metals are 
considered in this example to thoroughly evaluate the effectiveness of the hedges.  All the 
values appear to exhibit a common trend towards the mid-90% across the hedging 
horizons. The hedging effectiveness value represents the percentage reduction in variance 
over and beyond a portfolio unhedged.  It is evident that these optimal hedge ratios are 
useful in minimizing variance but even more important, the hedges improve across the 
time horizons.  Namely, a hedge may be more favorable as the hedging horizon is 
lengthened given the nature of price discovery in the spot and futures relationship.   
 
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE] 
 
A viable question in commodity purchasing departments is: how far out a 
company should hedge given the nature of the commodity landscape?  The empirical 
evidence contained in this study indicates that, in general, a longer hedging horizon may 
help mitigate the risk in the spot market.  The results provided in Table 7 indicate that the 
optimal hedging horizon should be at 8-week or the longest hedging horizon considered 
in this study.  This statement is not saying that the 8 week effectiveness value is always 
greatest at this horizon, as in the case of aluminum the 6-week horizon is preferred to the 
8-week horizon.  Rather, it is evident that these values are generally asymptotically 




improving across the horizons and therefore, it is inferred that this would also occur 
across a broader dataset.  A longer hedging horizon is the course of strategy advocated in 
this study.  
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
This study investigates the optimal hedge ratio and hedging effectiveness for six 
base metals markets. After applying careful econometrics methods, we first document 
that the short-run optimal hedging ratio is increasing in hedging horizon. If a corporate 
hedger is attenuating demand risks for his company with a longer time-frame in the 
futures market, he should increase his exposure to the futures market as his hedging 
horizon lengthens. Second, we show that the optimal hedging ratio, contrary to results in 
other markets, does not converge to the naïve ratio of 1 for our markets over our time-
period over longer time horizons. We document that the appropriate position a hedger 
should take is to over-hedge by over 5% in order to best minimize price impacts. Finally, 
we find that hedging effectiveness for the optimal hedging ratios we computed in an out-
of-sample methodology is very high in the mid-90’s in percentage terms. In other words, 
implementing a hedge with the hedge ratios we determined would eliminate over 90% of 
price uncertainty for large corporation procurement departments. Overall, the best 
hedging decision for these markets is to hedge long-term at about 6 to 8 weeks with a 
slightly greater than one hedge ratio. These results are robust to the increased volatility 
over our data period and are of great interest to many purchasing departments and other 
commodity hedgers. 
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Figure 1 graphs in two panels the complete time series of data used in the study. In each panel, 
using the same scale, we highlight the dramatic price increase experienced by the metals markets over the 








TABLE 1 – Data Description 
 Table 1 reports the time period and frequency of the data used in our empirical determination of 
the optimal hedge ratio and optimal hedging horizon. All prices are prices from the London Metal 
Exchange (LME). The futures price information is obtained from Futuresource, a platform relaying the 
LME data, and represents the near-by futures contract. The cash prices are related to the second bell close 
on the LME.  
 
 
Base Metal Data Sample Range Frequency Observations 
Aluminum July 8,1998 - October 19,2006 Daily  2068 
Copper July 8,1998 - October 19,2006 Daily  2066 
Lead July 8,1998 - October 19,2006 Daily  2068 
Nickel July 8,1998 - October 19,2006 Daily  2063 
Tin  July 15,1998 - October 19,2006 Daily  2064 
Zinc July 15,1998 - October 19,2006 Daily  2058 




TABLE 2 - Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 reports sample descriptive statistics for the cash prices for all 6 metal markets investigated in the 
study. Over the sample period, each of these markets exhibited a large change in both price level and 
volatility level. The table reports the mean, maximum, minimum and the standard deviation of prices for 
each market for the two distinct periods: before the price level change break and after the price level 
change break. The break points are determined visually from the historical price charts and are reported in 
the table below. In addition, the table reports the ratio of volatility to level of prices (σ/µ) before and after 
the break to confirm that the break represents both a change in level and a change in volatility in prices. 
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TABLE 3 – Perron Unit Root Test 
Table 3 reports the results of the Perron Unit Root test performed on both the cash and the futures price 
time series. The Perron Unit Test allows to determine if the price series is integrated of order 1, I(1).  Unit 
root testing was performed on weekly data. λ represents the proportion of the sample at which the break 
points occurs. The tests are based on Perron (1989) 10% critical values with both a slope and intercept 
shift. * denotes an I(1) series or unit root. 
 
 
Variables Cash Futures 
METAL Sample Frequency λ Test Statistic Critical Value λ Test Statistic Critical Value 
ALUMINUM Weekly (433) 0.8 -3.34* -3.69 0.8 -3.53* -3.69 
COPPER Weekly (433) 0.7 -2.77* -3.86 0.7 -2.51* -3.86 
LEAD Weekly (433) 0.7 0.02* -3.86 0.7 0.02* -3.86 
NICKEL Weekly (433) 0.7 -0.38* -3.86 0.7 0.14* -3.86 
TIN Weekly (433) 0.7 0.71* -3.86 0.7 -0.64* -3.86 
ZINC Weekly (433) 0.9 -2.53* -3.46 0.8 -3.97 -3.86 




TABLE 4- OLS Minimum Variance Hedge Ratio 
Table 4 reports the empirical results of estimating the optimal minimum variance hedge ratio for each of 
the six metal markets. The estimation in this table relies on Equation (4): 
(P1 – P0) = α + β (F1 – F0) + ε 
where the MV Hedge Ratio reported is the point estimate of β in Equation (4) found with an Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) estimation. The table also contains the standard deviation of the estimate and the adjusted 
R-Square of the OLS regression. The analysis is repeated at different level of differentiation from as short 
as one day to as long as 8 weeks. Due to data constraint (our time series contains 433 weeks worth of data), 






















ALUMINUM 0.475 0.909 0.973 0.996 1.002 1.020 1.067 1.054 1.006
(0.020) (0.020) (0.028) (0.028) (0.031) (0.036) (0.031) (0.038) (0.029)
0.210 0.824 0.853 0.899 0.907 0.903 0.940 0.927 0.959
COPPER 0.391 0.860 1.007 1.032 1.001 1.018 1.051 0.990 1.026
-0.019 -0.021 -1.027 -0.015 -0.020 -0.025 -0.016 -0.014 -0.016
0.178 0.800 0.868 0.973 0.960 0.953 0.983 0.988 0.987
LEAD 0.654 0.951 1.023 1.022 1.075 1.055 1.100 1.046 1.108
-0.023 -0.027 -0.036 -0.028 -0.049 -0.032 -0.034 -0.034 -0.032
0.284 0.749 0.792 0.904 0.820 0.930 0.938 0.941 0.957
NICKEL 0.526 0.992 1.103 1.074 1.116 1.002 1.084 1.034 1.173
-0.022 -0.025 -0.028 -0.037 -0.032 -0.027 -0.021 -0.047 -0.044
0.218 0.788 0.879 0.853 0.920 0.944 0.975 0.892 0.932
TIN 0.443 0.832 0.872 1.004 1.012 1.062 1.030 1.043 1.053
-0.021 -0.026 -0.028 -0.023 -0.030 -0.043 -0.028 -0.029 -0.032
0.185 0.701 0.820 0.903 0.915 0.880 0.951 0.957 0.954
ZINC 0.554 0.982 0.986 1.099 1.036 1.002 1.059 1.117 1.079
-0.021 -0.020 -0.025 -0.023 -0.024 -0.016 -0.024 -0.017 -0.014
























TABLE 5 – Pesaran Cointegration Tests 
Table 5 reports the results of test statistics about the cointegration of the data series.  Specifically, the 
Pesaran cointegration test (1997) is run. The test employed has two variables (k), an intercept and no trend. 
The 10% critical value is 4.14 in this case. Cointegration was also found to be the case in Engle-Granger 



































TABLE 6 – Joint Estimation of the Short-Run and Long-Run MV Hedge Ratios 
Table 6 reports the empirical results of estimating the optimal minimum variance hedge ratio for each of 
the six metal markets. The estimation in this table relies on Equation (12): 
(P1 – P0) = α1 + α2Pt-1 + α3Ft-1 + β (F1 – F0) + ε 
where the (short-run) MV Hedge Ratio reported is the point estimate of β in Equation (12). The table also 
contains the standard deviation of the estimate and the adjusted R-Square for that estimation. The long-run 
MV Hedge ratio is computed as –α3/α2 and is also reported. The analysis is repeated at different level of 
differentiation from as short as one day to as long as 8 weeks. Due to data constraint (our time series 
contains 433 weeks worth of data), we limit our longest hedging horizon to 8 weeks to insure our results 






















ALUMINUM 0.624 0.946 0.981 0.985 0.982 1.009 1.033 1.013 0.987
(0.021) (0.019) (0.025) (0.025) (0.027) (0.030) (0.031) (0.034) (0.027)
0.990 0.996 0.992 0.997 0.994 0.995 0.991 1.007 0.983
0.305 0.859 0.887 0.922 0.935 0.941 0.954 0.954 0.971
COPPER 0.487 0.901 1.022 1.036 1.009 1.044 1.063 0.999 1.042
(0.020) (0.020) (0.025) (0.015) (0.020) (0.023) (0.017) (0.014) (0.016)
1.017 1.026 1.033 1.045 1.040 1.046 1.061 1.050 1.060
0.227 0.829 0.894 0.976 0.967 0.966 0.987 0.990 0.990
LEAD 0.716 0.967 1.029 1.018 1.063 1.033 1.078 1.059 1.100
(0.023) (0.025) (0.033) (0.027) (0.046) (0.031) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
1.044 1.053 1.056 1.052 1.064 1.053 1.065 1.065 1.053
0.335 0.783 0.830 0.918 0.862 0.944 0.949 0.952 0.963
NICKEL 0.597 0.996 1.088 1.055 1.109 0.999 1.059 1.051 1.128
(0.023) (0.024) (0.027) (0.035) (0.032) (0.028) (0.023) (0.047) (0.048)
1.054 1.063 1.068 1.059 1.072 1.033 1.042 1.069 1.091
0.262 0.810 0.899 0.889 0.935 0.952 0.979 0.921 0.952
TIN 0.596 0.908 0.926 1.004 1.009 1.066 1.015 1.043 1.033
(0.021) (0.024) (0.026) (0.024) (0.030) (0.034) (0.025) (0.024) (0.028)
1.027 1.030 1.030 1.025 1.033 1.038 1.030 1.030 1.024
0.285 0.768 0.859 0.927 0.939 0.926 0.965 0.971 0.969
ZINC 0.617 0.994 0.993 1.058 1.002 0.997 1.073 1.015 1.112
(0.023) (0.025) (0.018) (0.018) (0.026) (0.019) (0.022) (0.031) (0.038)
1.032 1.012 1.029 1.036 1.032 1.032 1.029 1.031 1.031






























TABLE 7 – Hedging Effectiveness using Out-of-Sample Analysis 
Table 7 reports the empirical results of implementing the optimal long-run MV Hedge Ratio as determined 
with the technique used in Table 6. However, in order not to resample, we split the sample in two halves. 
The first half of the data is used to estimate Equation (12) and to determine the optimal long-run MV 
Hedge Ratio. This optimal Hedge Ratio was then used to put in place a hedged position for the second half 
of the sample. We keep track of the changes in value of that portfolio defined as Equation (13): 
∆Vh = Q*(∆Pt ) + X*(∆Ft) 
We use the series of ∆Vh to compute the Hedging Effectiveness as defined in Equation (14): 
1 – [Var(∆Vh) / Var(∆Pt)] 





















ALUMINUM Hedging Effectiveness 0.839 0.850 0.927 0.902 0.899 0.960 0.936 0.942 
  Optimal Hedge Ratio 0.923 1.037 0.976 1.080 1.052 1.090 1.026 1.1066 
COPPER Hedging Effectiveness 0.747 0.773 0.844 0.887 0.842 0.932 0.924 0.962 
  Optimal Hedge Ratio 0.876 0.912 0.995 1.015 1.091 1.074 1.084 1.031 
LEAD Hedging Effectiveness 0.916 0.935 0.921 0.943 0.957 0.949 0.965 0.966 
  Optimal Hedge Ratio 0.964 1.012 1.002 1.058 1.059 1.025 1.064 1.098 
NICKEL Hedging Effectiveness   0.789 0.815 0.860 0.892 0.926 0.935 0.947 0.953 
  Optimal Hedge Ratio 0.984 1.054 1.036 1.093 1.048 1.011 1.112 1.100 
TIN Hedging Effectiveness 0.799 0.846 0.882 0.916 0.932 0.914 0.926 0.954 
  Optimal Hedge Ratio 0.914 0.938 1.012 1.009 1.045 1.037 1.055 1.041 
ZINC Hedging Effectiveness 0.869 0.881 0.900 0.912 0.897 0.925 0.946 0.979 
  Optimal Hedge Ratio 0.979 0.999 1.078 1.001 1.071 1.036 1.050 1.093 
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We examine the impact of demutualization announcements by 13 life insurance companies 
during 1996-2000 on the value of existing stock-owned life insurance companies and companies 
in other segments of the insurance industry.  Demutualization announcements are associated with 
negative stock price reactions in the days around the announcement, and with larger and positive 
stock price reactions in the days following announcement.  Overall, the results support the 
contention that life insurance company demutualizations signal favorable future industry 
conditions and/or increased likelihood of future acquisitions for all segments of the insurance 
industry.  Active-minded investors may use these results to develop alpha-generating investment 
strategies. 
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The life insurance industry and banking industry share a common dichotomy of 
organizational forms whereby some companies organized as mutually-owned firms, “mutuals,” 
(owned by policyholders or account holders) and others organized as stock-owned firms, (owned 
by shareholders) coexist in the industry.  Competitive pressures, access to capital markets, 
limited liability, and regulatory changes in the banking industry have led many mutually-owned 
banks to convert to stock-owned companies.  More recently this phenomenon has been exhibited 
in the insurance industry, with several mutually-owned life insurance companies undergoing 
conversion into stock-owned companies.  This demutualization presents research opportunities to 
better understand the causes and consequences of the change in organizational form.  We 
examine one dimension of the demutualization of life insurance companies—the intra-industry 
effects. 
Demutualization of a life insurance company may signal future growth for the industry as 
a whole, leading to increased stock valuations for competitors in the industry—the information 
effects hypothesis.  Conversely, demutualization may signal that the firm is moving to a stock-
owned form to raise additional capital for growth and better competitive position within the 
industry, leading to reduced stock valuations for existing competitors in the industry—the 
competitive pressure hypothesis.  A better understanding of these effects will provide useful 
information to investors and managers seeking to evaluate the impact of organizational structure 
changes on the value of firms in the insurance industry. 
We examine two relevant research questions.  First, do life insurance company 
demutualizations impact the value of competing stock-owned life insurance companies?  And 
second, do life insurance company demutualizations impact the value of stock-owned companies 
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in other segments of the insurance industry?  With regard to the first research question, we find a 
statistically significant negative announcement effect around the event date, consistent with the 
competitive pressure hypothesis, and larger positive announcement effects in periods up to 30 
days subsequent to the event date, consistent with the information effects hypothesis.  With 
regard to the second research question, we also find a statistically significant negative 
announcement effect around the event date, consistent with the competitive pressure hypothesis, 
and larger positive announcement effects in periods up to 30 days subsequent to the event date, 
consistent with the information effects hypothesis.   
Taken together, these results indicate that there is significant information contained in 
demutualization announcements by life insurance companies.  This information affects both 
stock-owned competitors in the life insurance industry and firms in other segments of the 
insurance industry in a similar fashion.  The results are consistent with both the competitive 
pressure and information effects hypotheses.  Given the larger and longer-term nature of the 
positive announcement effects, the results are more supportive of the information effects 
hypothesis.  Life insurance company demutualizations signal favorable future industry 
conditions and/or increased likelihood of future acquisitions for all segments of the insurance 
industry. 
These results also have implications for active investors seeking alpha-generating return 
strategies around life insurance demutualizations.  Given the short-term negative stock-price 
reaction followed by the longer-term positive response, active investors can generate positive 
abnormal returns by longing publicly traded firms in the insurance industry following a 
demutualization announcement by a life insurer. 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In Section II we provide a summary 
of the relevant literature and the objectives of this research.  In Section III we describe the 
sample and research method.  Section IV contains the empirical results.  In Section V we provide 
a summary and conclusion. 
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND TESTABLE  
The life insurance industry exhibits a dichotomy of organizational forms whereby some 
companies are organized as mutually-owned firms, owned by policyholders, and other firms are 
organized as stock-owned companies, owned by shareholders.  A recent report by Optima (2000) 
notes that the life insurance industry is rapidly changing due to increased competition, falling 
regulatory barriers, globalization, the Internet, demographics, and a shift in product demand.  In 
response to these changes, many insurance companies are moving to demutualize in response to 
increased competition and a drive to become more efficient.  Demutualization and future growth 
opportunities have also been facilitated by the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999.  
The phenomenon has recently extended to the Japanese market with an announcement by Mitsui 
Mutual that it would convert to stock ownership in April 2004; see AFX (2003). 
Demutualization brings with it numerous advantages and disadvantages.  Advantages 
include: increased management accountability, discipline from the capital markets, increased 
access to capital for internal growth and acquisitions, and increased access to the managerial 
labor market.  Disadvantages include: high conversion costs, policyholders may pay more for 
policies, increased agency costs, and short-term pressures from Wall Street.  Smith and Stutzer 
(1995) note that information asymmetries and agency problems offer possible explanations for 
the organizational choice of insurance companies.  They argue that informational asymmetries 
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do more to explain the kinds of contracts offered by mutuals than do agency problems.  Spiller 
(1972), Spiller (1973), and Newmann (1973) examine ownership and performance of stock and 
mutual life insurance companies.  They find that stock-owned life insurance companies perform 
better than mutually-owned companies.  This is consistent with Williamson’s (1963) expense 
preference hypothesis, in that mutual company management may operate to enhance perquisite 
compensation or otherwise engage in inefficient activities.  Mutual company managers, less 
subject to monitoring and control by the market and by stockholders, will be less effective in 
minimizing costs; see Boose (1991) and Kroll, Wright, and Theerathorn (1993). 
In demutualization announcements, companies typically list access to capital as a primary 
motive; see Bailey (1995), Goldstein and Avril (1998), and Dauer (1998).  Empirical evidence 
that the need for capital and opportunity to control free cash flow motivate life-insurance 
company demutualizations is provided by Cole, McNamara, and Wells (1995), Carson, Foster, 
and McNamara (1998), and Butler, Cui, and Whitman (2000).  Viswanathan and Cummins 
(2003) find significant support for the access to capital hypothesis among both life-health and 
property-liability insurers that have demutualized since 1981. 
Demutualization has also been a topic of study in the banking industry.  Masulis (1987) 
finds that conversion from a mutual savings bank to a stock-owned savings bank results in 
abnormal returns to shareholders.  Jordan, Verbrugge, and Burns (1988) report similar results, 
finding that demutualizing thrifts tend to post abnormally high returns in the days following their 
IPOs.  Carhill and Hasan (1997) find that over the long run, thrifts that demutualize experience 
poor performance that is driven primarily by the increased operational costs of stock-owned 
firms.  Carter and Stover (1990) find that demutualization of savings and loans has little impact 
on managerial behavior.   
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Demutualizations impact a variety of factors of interest to individual investors and 
financial services professionals.  Existing studies of demutualization, in either banking or 
insurance, do not examine the impact of demutualization on the competitive landscape of the 
relevant industry.  In this paper, we examine the intra-industry effects of demutualization in the 
life insurance industry.  We examine two relevant research questions.  First, do life insurance 
company demutualizations impact the value of existing stock-owned life insurance companies?  
And second, do life insurance company demutualizations impact the value of existing stock-
owned companies in other segments of the insurance industry? 
There is a literature that examines the intra-industry effects of acquisition decisions.  This 
methodology can be employed to study the issue at hand.  For example, Bittlingmayer and 
Hazlett (2000) examine the response of the stock prices of Microsoft’s competitors to the 
announcement of antitrust enforcement actions against Microsoft.  They find that the competitors 
experience negative stock price reactions to the enforcement actions against Microsoft, casting 
doubt on the notion that Microsoft’s actions are anticompetitive.  Akhigbe and Martin (2002) 
examine whether acquisitions by Microsoft Corporation affect the stock prices of competitors in 
the computer industry.  They report mixed results, depending on the business line of the 
acquisition. 
Following Akhigbe and Martin (2002) we posit two potentially offsetting effects of intra-
industry effects in response to demutualizations of life insurance companies.  The information 
effects hypothesis posits that demutualizations signal favorable future industry conditions and/or 
the increased likelihood of future acquisitions in the industry [see also Song and Walkling 
(2000)].  Favorable industry conditions would benefit all life insurance companies, leading to a 
positive stock price reaction for existing stock-owned companies.  The competitive pressure 
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hypothesis posits that industry rivals will be negatively impacted by demutualizations if the 
conversion provides the former mutually-owned company a more efficient organizational form, 
increased access to capital, and increased competitiveness in the industry [see also Akhigbe and 
Martin (2000)]. 
The increased capital provided to life insurance companies from demutualization may 
also allow these firms to expand into other segments of the insurance industry.  Announcements 
of demutualization by life insurers then may also signal information effects or competitive 
pressure to these other segments of the insurance industry. 
 
III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
III.1. DATA 
We obtain a sample of demutualized life insurance companies by performing a search on 
Lexis/Nexis.  We search for “demutualization” and “stock conversion” for the period 1996 
through 2000.  We focus on a relatively short and recent period that was characterized by 
increased competition, falling regulatory barriers, globalization, expanded used of the Internet, 
demographic changes, and a shift in product demand; see Optima (2000).  This period allows us 
to examine the intra-industry effects of demutualizations during a short period of homogeneous 
industry conditions.  The event date is defined as the date that the demutualization is first 
mentioned in the Wall Street Journal, or on Lexis/Nexis if not mentioned in the Wall Street 
Journal.  The results of the search are summarized in Table 1.  We find 13 life insurance 
companies that demutualized during this period with data available on CRSP and with 
announcement dates available either in the Wall Street Journal or on Lexis/Nexis. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
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To examine the structure of the insurance industry, we gather data on competitors in the 
life insurance (SIC 6311) industry and in other segments of the insurance industry: accident and 
health (SIC 6321), hospital and medical service plans (SIC 6324), fire, marine and casualty (SIC 
6331), surety (SIC 6351), title (SIC 6361), and insurance carriers (SIC 6399).  A listing of all 
firms in the life insurance industry (primary SIC code 6311), with data available on Compustat, 
is contained in Table 2, along with data on total assets, net sales, and market capitalization for 
the year ended 2000.  The result is a total of 54 companies, twelve of which demutualized in the 
1996 to 2001 period and 42 stock-owned life insurance companies that existed prior to 1996.2 
Insert Table 2 about here 
Descriptive statistics on the demutualizing companies, the existing stock-owned 
companies, and the combined group are shown in Table 3.  The twelve demutualizing companies 
have sales ranging from $813 million to $42,544 million.  The 42 existing stock-owned 
companies have sales ranging from $5 million to $94,251 million.  The twelve demutualizing 
companies have mean sales of $12,558 million and median sales of $8,150 million.  The 42 
existing stock-owned companies have mean sales of $7,082 million and median sales of $490 
million.  Overall, the demutualizing companies are larger than the existing stock companies, but 
the difference in means is not statistically significant. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
III.2. METHODOLOGY 
To test the information effects and competitive pressure hypotheses, we compute 
cumulative abnormal returns for the stock-owned life insurance companies and the other stock-
                                                          
2 Only twelve demutualizing firms are shown here because Summit Life Corp. does not have data available on 
Compustat, but is included in the sample because it does have data on CRSP. 
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owned insurance companies around the announcement dates of the demutualizations.  We use the 
standard event study methodology of Brown and Warner (1985) to compute the daily excess 
returns.  We use a two-step procedure to compute the average daily abnormal returns with stock 
price data from CRSP. 
First, we estimate the parameters of a single-factor market model for each firm.  We use 
the returns for days -255 to -46 to estimate each firm's alpha and beta coefficients.  As is 
standard in applying event-study methodology, we utilize an estimation period of approximately 
200 trading days of returns.  To limit the possibility of any estimation bias, we stop the 
estimation period at day -46, well in advance of the accumulation period. 
Second, we compute the abnormal return on day t as: 
 









      (1) 
 
where, 
 N = the number of observations, 
 ARit = Rit - αi - βi RMt, 
 Rit = the daily return for firm i on day t 
 αi, βi = parameters of the market model estimated over days -255 to -46 and  
 RMt = the daily return on the CRSP equally-weighted index (including dividends)  
  on day t. 
 
Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are computed as: 
 













 t1 = the first day of the accumulation period, and  
 t2 = the last day of the accumulation period. 
 
We test the abnormal returns for statistical significance using a Z-statistic as described in 
Mikkelson and Partch (1988).   The Z-statistic is computed as: 
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The denominator is the square root of the variance of the cumulative abnormal return of firm i.  
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where, 
 iV 2 = the residual variance of firm i's market model regression, 
 T = the number of days in the accumulation period (t2-t1+1), 
 ED = the number of days in the period used to estimate the market model, and 






In this section we present our results on the impact of life insurance company 
demutualization announcements on the value of stock-owned firms in the life insurance industry 
and on firms in other segments of the insurance industry.  We find a negative and significant 
short-term announcement effect, offset by a larger long-term announcement effect.  The results 
support both the competitive pressure and information effects hypotheses for both the life 
insurance industry and for the other segments of the insurance industry.  Overall, the results are 
more supportive of the information effects hypothesis. 
 
IV.1. IMPACT OF DEMUTUALIZATIONS ON OTHER STOCK-OWNED LIFE 
INSURERS  
The event study results for the impact of life insurance company demutualizations on 
stock-owned competitors in the life-insurance industry are summarized in Table 4.  Table 4 
shows cumulative abnormal returns for several event windows.  The results are shown for three 
long pre-event windows: (-30,-5), (-20,-5), (-10,-5); two short event windows: (-2,2), (-1,1); and 
six long post-event and event windows: (1,10), (1,20), (1,30), (-1,10), (-1,20), (-1,30). 
Insert Table 4 about here 
The announcement effects for the periods leading up to the demutualization 
announcement are not statistically different from zero.  The announcement effect immediately 
around the announcement of demutualization (-1,1) is –0.65% statistically significant at the 5% 
level.  The announcement effects for the longer periods subsequent to announcement (1,10), 
(1,20), and (1,30) are 0.67%, 2.30%, and 2.28% respectively, statistically significant at the 5%, 
1%, and 1% levels respectively.  Considering both the event-date and long-window post-event 
effects, the abnormal returns for windows (-1,10), (-1,20), and (-1,30) are 0.17%, 1.80%, and 
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1.78% respectively.  The results for the first window are not statistically significant, while those 
for the two longer windows are significant at the 1% and 5% levels respectively. 
The result showing a statistically significant negative announcement effect around the 
event date is consistent with the competitive pressure hypothesis, whereby demutualizing 
companies with a new organizational structure and increased access to capital lead to increased 
industry competition.  The lager positive announcement effects in periods up to 30 days 
subsequent to the event day are consistent with the information effects hypothesis, whereby 
demutualization signals favorable future industry conditions and/or increased likelihood of future 
acquisitions in the industry.  The overall reaction is also consistent with the information effects 
hypothesis. 
 
IV.2. IMPACT OF DEMUTUALIZATIONS ON FIRMS IN OTHER SEGMENTS OF 
THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY 
The event study results for the impact of life insurance company demutualizations on 
companies in other segments of the insurance industry are summarized in Table 5.  Table 5 
shows cumulative abnormal returns for several event windows.  The results are shown for three 
long pre-event windows: (-30,-5), (-20,-5), (-10,-5); two short event windows: (-2,2), (-1,1); and 
six long post-event and event windows: (1,10), (1,20), (1,30), (-1,10), (-1,20), (-1,30). 
Insert Table 5 about here 
The announcement effects for the periods leading up to the demutualization 
announcement are not statistically different from zero.  The announcement effect immediately 
around the announcement of demutualization (-2,2) is –0.41%, statistically significant at the 1% 
level.  The announcement effect for the longer periods subsequent to announcement (1,10), 
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(1,20), and (1,30) are 0.85%, 2.33%, and 2.57% respectively, statistically significant at the 5%, 
1%, and 1% levels respectively.  Considering both the event-date and long-window post-event 
effects, the abnormal returns for windows (-1,10), (-1,20), and (-1,30) are 0.68%, 2.15%, and 
2.39% respectively.  The results for the first window are not statistically significant, while those 
for the two longer windows are significant at the 1% level. 
These results for other segments of the insurance industry are similar to the results for the 
life insurance industry.  The period immediately around the demutualization announcement 
shows a negative stock price reaction, consistent with the competitive pressure hypothesis.  The 
lager positive announcement effect in periods up to 30 days subsequent to the event day is 
consistent with the information effects hypothesis, whereby demutualization signals favorable 
future industry conditions and/or increased likelihood of future acquisitions in these other 
segments of the life insurance industry.  The overall reaction is also consistent with the 
information effects hypothesis. 
Taken together, the results show that there is significant information contained in 
demutualization announcements by life insurance companies.  This information affects both 
stock-owned competitors in the life insurance industry and firms in other segments of the 
insurance industry in a similar fashion.  The results are consistent with both the competitive 
pressure and information effects hypotheses.  Given the larger and longer-term nature of the 
positive announcement effects, the results are more supportive of the information effects 
hypothesis.  Life insurance company demutualizations signal favorable future industry 





V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The conversion of mutually-owned life insurance companies to stock-owned companies 
is a relatively recent phenomenon that represents an opportunity to better understand the causes 
and consequences of conversion along many dimensions.  We examine one dimension of the 
demutualization of life insurance companies, the intra-industry effects.  We examine two 
relevant research questions.  Do life insurance company demutualizations impact the value of 
competing stock-owned life insurance companies?  And, do life insurance company 
demutualizations impact the value of stock-owned companies in other segments of the insurance 
industry?  We test two competing hypotheses of demutualization—the information effects 
hypothesis and the competitive pressure hypothesis. 
We find that demutualization announcements are associated with a negative stock price 
reaction around the time of announcement for both existing stock-owned life insurance 
companies and for stock-owned companies in other segments of the insurance industry.  This is 
consistent with the competitive pressure hypothesis.  We find larger positive wealth effects for 
both groups of firms in the post-announcement period going out 30 days after the announcement.  
This is consistent with the information effects hypothesis.  Overall, the results show that there is 
significant information contained in demutualization announcements by life insurance 
companies.  Given the larger and longer-term nature of the positive announcement effects, the 
results are more supportive of the information effects hypothesis.  Life insurance company 
demutualizations signal favorable future industry conditions and/or increased likelihood of future 
acquisitions for all segments of the insurance industry. 
Active-minded investors may use these results to develop alpha-generating return 
strategies around life insurance demutualizations.  Given the short-term negative stock-price 
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reaction followed by the longer-term positive response, active investors can generate positive 
abnormal returns by longing publicly traded firms in the insurance industry following a 
demutualization announcement by a life insurer. 
The results suggest that life insurance company demutualizations do signal changes in the 
competitive structure of the life insurance industry and in other segments of the insurance 
industry.  A better understanding of these effects will provide useful information to investors 
seeking to evaluate the impact of organizational structure on demutualizing life insurance 
companies and on competitors in the insurance industry.  Future research should focus on better 
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Demutualizing Life Insurance Companies 
 
Companies announcing a demutualization during the period 1996-2000, determined by a 
Lexis/Nexis search.  Companies are in the Life Insurance industry—Primary SIC code 6311.  
Date is the first mention of demutualization in the Wall Street Journal or on Lexis/Nexis.  
Companies have required data available on CRSP. 
 
Demutualizing Company Announcement 
Date 
Source 
AmerUs Group Co. 12/1/98 Wall Street Journal 
Canada Life Financial Corp. 4/2/98 Lexis/Nexis 
John Hancock Financial Services, Inc. 5/13/98 Wall Street Journal 
Manulife Financial Corp. 1/21/98 Wall Street Journal 
Metlife, Inc. 3/6/98 Wall Street Journal 
MONY Group, Inc. 9/9/97 Wall Street Journal 
Nationwide Financial Services 10/28/96 Wall Street Journal 
Phoenix Companies, Inc. 4/2/00 Lexis/Nexis 
Principal Financial Group, Inc. 3/3/00 Wall Street Journal 
Prudential Financial, Inc. 2/12/98 Wall Street Journal 
Prudential PLC 6/15/00 Wall Street Journal 
Summit Life Corp. 10/19/98 Lexis/Nexis 
Sun Life Financial Services of Canada, 1/28/98 Lexis/Nexis 
   
Distribution by Year Number Percent 
1996 1   7.7% 
1997 1   7.7% 
1998 8 61.5% 
1999 0   0.0% 
2000 3 23.1% 






Assets, Sales, and Market Capitalization of Life Insurance Companies 
(Primary SIC Code 6311) 
 
All life insurance companies with data on Standard & Poor’s Compustat are shown.   Companies 
shown in bold are those that demutualized during 1996-2000.  (Note: Only twelve demutualizing 
firms are shown here because Summit Life Corp. does not have data available on Compustat, but 
is included in the sample because it does have data on CRSP.)  Amounts, in millions of dollars, 
are for year ended 12/31/00. 
 
Company Name Sales Assets Market Cap. 
AEGON NV $28,872.80 $229,269.98 $63,543.79 
ALLSTATE LIFE INSUR CO/NY $317.56 $3,502.51 na 
AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL 
GROUP $45,972.00 $306,577.00 $296,047.88 
AMERICAN NATIONAL 
INSURANCE $1,834.48 $9,270.39 na 
AMERICO LIFE INC $450.43 $4,241.15 na 
AMERUS GROUP CO  -CL A $813.39 $11,471.52 $1,384.73 
ANNUITY AND LIFE RE 
HLDGS $307.15 $2,224.69 $814.41 
AXA  -SPON ADR $94,250.83 $445,569.50 na 
CANADA LIFE FINL CORP $4,979.08 $21,815.63 $4,837.61 
CITIZENS FINL CORP KY $31.30 $135.54 $28.69 
CITIZENS INC $66.68 $267.84 $175.75 
CONVERIUM HOLDINGS AG  -
ADR $2,150.50 $8,321.30 na 
COTTON STATES LIFE 
INSURANCE $41.51 $211.30 $72.97 
DELPHI FINANCIAL GRP  -CL 
A $512.89 $3,440.01 $1,291.84 
ERIE FAMILY LIFE INS CO $111.94 $1,020.34 $166.20 
FBL FINL GROUP INC  -CL A $367.62 $3,704.05 $685.99 
FINANCIAL INDS CORP $44.42 $300.77 $81.79 
FIRST ALLIANCE CP/KY $4.48 $21.09 na 
GLOBAL PREFERRED HLDGS -
REDH $30.04 $56.62 na 
GREAT AMERN FINL 
RESOURCES $824.30 $7,975.90 $1,178.58 
GREAT-WEST LIFE & 
ANNUITY IN $3,164.62 $27,897.39 $260.25 
GUARDIAN LIFE INS CO OF 
AMER $6,743.30 $32,359.30 na 
HANCOCK JOHN FINL SVCS 
INC $7,454.30 $87,353.30 $12,634.93 




ING GROEP NV  -ADR $46,926.86 $610,381.50 na 
ING LIFE INS & ANNUITY CO $1,654.30 $57,153.00 na 
JEFFERSON-PILOT CORP $3,238.00 $27,321.00 $8,946.01 
KANSAS CITY LIFE INS CO $472.91 $3,646.26 $466.59 
LINCOLN NATIONAL CORP $6,851.89 $99,844.06 $10,834.42 
MANULIFE FINL CORP $9,437.97 $40,058.68 $16,019.06 
MAX RE CAPITAL LTD $451.32 $935.50 na 
MERRILL LYNCH LIFE INSUR 
CO $507.48 $16,543.51 na 
METLIFE INC $31,947.00 $255,018.00 $31,455.00 
METROPOLITN MTG & SEC  -
CL A $171.42 $1,252.93 na 
MONY GROUP INC $1,251.80 $24,575.30 $2,902.67 
NATIONWIDE FINL SVCS  -
CL A $3,170.30 $93,178.60 $6,830.35 
NATL WSTN LIFE INS CO  -CL 
A $292.72 $3,697.96 $360.93 
NEW YORK LIFE INSURANCE $21,996.00 $97,101.00 na 
NORTHWESTERN MUTUAL 
LIFE INS $16,529.00 $92,125.00 na 
PHOENIX COMPANIES INC $2,898.60 $20,313.20 na 
PRESIDENTIAL LIFE CORP $284.46 $2,982.43 $781.35 
PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL GRP 
INC $8,845.80 $84,404.90 na 
PROTECTIVE LIFE CORP $1,733.97 $15,145.63 $2,576.64 
PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL 
INC $26,544.00 $272,753.00 na 
PRUDENTIAL PLC  -ADR $42,543.98 $231,727.72 na 
REINSURANCE GROUP AMER 
INC $1,725.74 $6,061.86 $2,020.92 
SCOTTISH ANNUITY & LIFE 
HLDG $83.93 $1,178.50 $187.82 
SOUTHERN SEC LIFE INS $10.63 $77.13 $7.68 
STANDARD MANAGEMENT 
CORP $76.06 $1,470.46 $54.00 
SUN LIFE FINL SVCS CDA 
INC $10,807.78 $37,214.36 $12,602.90 
THRIVENT FINL FOR 
LUTHERANS $2,322.00 $22,112.00 na 
TORCHMARK CORP $2,515.89 $12,962.56 $5,741.27 
UNITED TRUST GROUP INC $35.75 $333.62 $28.43 
YADKIN VALLEY  BK & TR 





Descriptive Statistics for Demutualizing and Existing Stock-Owned Life Insurance 
Companies (Primary SIC Code 6311) 
 
All life insurance companies with data on Standard & Poor’s Compustat are shown.  Only twelve 
demutualizing firms are shown here because Summit Life Corp. does not have data available on 
Compustat, but is included in the sample because it does have data on CRSP.)  Amounts, in 
millions of dollars, are for year ended 12/31/00. 
 
Demutualizing Firms Sales Assets Market Cap. 
Number of firms 12 12 8
Maximum $42,543.98 $272,753.00 $31,455.00
Minimum $813.39 $11,471.52 $1,384.73
Mean* $12,557.83 $98,323.68 $11,083.41
Median $8,150.05 $62,231.79 $9,716.62
 
Existing Stock-Owned Firms Sales Assets Market Cap. 
Number of firms 42 42 25
Maximum $94,250.83 $610,381.50 $296,047.88
Minimum $4.48 $21.09 $7.68
Mean* $7,082.33 $54,711.89 $15,857.27
Median $490.20 $3,972.60 $466.59
 
All Firms Sales Assets Market Cap. 
Number of firms 54 54 33
Maximum $94,250.83 $610,381.50 $296,047.88
Minimum $4.48 $21.09 $7.68
Mean* $8,299.11 $64,403.40 $14,699.97
Median $1,609.02 $12,217.04 $1,178.58
 
 





Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Existing Stock-Owned Life Insurance Companies 
(Primary SIC Code 6311) Around the Announcement of Demutualization by a Mutually-
Owned Life Insurance Company 
 
Results are relative to first announcement of demutualization in either the Wall Street Journal or 
Lexis/Nexis for thirteen demutualization announcements occurring in 1996-2000.  A market 
model is used to estimate abnormal returns. 
 
 
   Mean  
   Cumulative  
Event Number  Abnormal  
Window of Obs.  Return z-Stat. 
Long-Window Pre-Event Returns: 
-30,-5 245 0.26% -0.529
-20,-5 245 -0.56% -1.608
-10,-5 245 -0.35% -0.783
 
Short-Window Event-Date Returns: 
-2,2 245 -0.51% -1.158
-1,1 245 -0.65% -2.252**
 
Long-Window Post-Event and Event-Date Returns: 
1,10 245 0.67% 2.234**
1,20 245 2.30% 4.132***
1,30 245 2.28% 3.050***
-1,10 245 0.17% 1.260
-1,20 245 1.80% 3.364***
-1,30 245 1.78% 2.475**
 
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level 
**   Statistically significant at the 5% level 






Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Non Life Insurance Segments of the Insurance Industry 
(Primary SIC Codes 6321—Accident and Health, 6324—Hospital and Medical, 6331—Fire, 
Marine, and Casualty, 6351—Surety, 6361—Title, and 6399—Insurance Carriers) Around 
the Announcement of Demutualization by a Mutually-Owned Life Insurance Company 
 
Results are relative to first announcement of demutualization in either the Wall Street Journal or 
Lexis/Nexis for thirteen demutualization announcements occurring in 1996-2000.  A market 
model is used to estimate abnormal returns. 
 
 
   Mean  
   Cumulative  
Event Number  Abnormal  
Window of Obs.  Return z-Stat. 
Long-Window Pre-Event Returns: 
-30,-5 1,014 0.62% 0.603
-20,-5 1,014 0.09% -0.869
-10,-5 1,014 -0.38% -1.403
  
Short-Window Event-Date Returns: 
-2,2 1,014 -0.41% -3.281***
-1,1 1,014 -0.14% -1.588
  
Long-Window Post-Event and Event-Date Returns: 
1,10 1,014 0.85% 2.221**
1,20 1,014 2.33% 6.192***
1,30 1,014 2.57% 4.905***
-1,10 1,014 0.68% 1.342
-1,20 1,014 2.15% 5.397***
-1,30 1,014 2.39% 4.329***
 
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level 
**   Statistically significant at the 5% level 








ACTIVE VERSUS PASSIVE INVESTING - 
AN ANALYSIS OF UK EQUITY MARKETS, 1991-2005 
 
 
Barnes, E.1 and Scott, M. 






This study examines the pattern of active versus passive trading in UK equities over 
the period 1991-2005. We describe a metric to analyse trading activity and volumes in 
the UK FTSE350 and AIM markets, with emphasis on industrial and size-based 
effects.12,1  Our findings indicate that active stock picking has been consistently 
declining in the UK market over the period studied for all markets, size quintiles and 
in virtually every industrial sector.  Moreover, trading patterns reveal a pronounced 
size effect with significantly less stock picking in larger capitalisation stocks vis-à-vis 
smaller stocks.  Patterns of investment in the AIM suggest an increase in index trading 
over time but higher overall levels of stock picking relative to the FTSE350 list.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
     Theories of efficient markets, standard paradigms of academic and empirical 
finance, have clear implications for asset combination and diversification decisions.  
If markets are efficient and operate well, prices should reflect all available 
information regarding firms’ financial position and future prospects and it should not 
be possible to beat the market other than by chance.  Investors should only be able to 
earn abnormal returns by having access to private firm information, superior 
forecasting ability or through chance.  In consequence, rather than incur the 
significant private costs of research to obtain proprietary information, investors 
should be as well off investing (passively) in a market index which includes a broad 
range of different securities.  With this approach, the volume of trade in any particular 
stock should reflect the weight of that firm in the market portfolio/index, and market 
weighting should explain fully the variation in volume of trade.   
     However in a climate of low interest rates, as investors seek superior returns one 
might expect significant active investment as distinct from passive investment.  This 
leads to an upsurge in the use of skill and research on the part of professional 
investors to identify mispriced securities and trade on that mispricing, a process which 
is costly and which offers no guarantee that benefits will outweigh the very 
substantial costs of information acquisition and trading.  Carhart (1997) among others 
documents the magnitude of active vis-à-vis passive trading costs and notes that, in 
terms of net returns, actively managed investment funds have tended to under-perform 
their passively managed counterparts.2  If the benefits of active fund management 
consistently fail to outweigh the costs passive investment is surely more constructive 
for investors.   
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     Despite extensive empirical evidence on patterns in, and costs of active vis-à-vis 
passive trading, evidence largely relates to US markets and comparatively little 
research has been conducted into patterns of trading in UK markets.  Given the global 
significance of the London market, we consider that an in-depth examination of active 
vis-à-vis passive trading patterns for the UK is merited, and that such evidence would 
represent an interesting increment to the body of literature at this point.  The purpose 
of this study is to examine the pattern of active versus passive trading in UK equities 
over the period 1991-2005 inclusive.   Drawing on the two fund separation theorem 
(Lo and Wang, 2000; Bhattacharya and Galpin, 2005) we describe a metric to analyse 
trading activity and volumes in the UK FTSE350 and AIM markets, with emphasis on 
industrial and size-based effects.12,1 
     Our findings indicate that active stock picking has been consistently declining in 
the UK market over the period studied for all markets, size quintiles and in virtually 
every industrial sector, which evidence is consistent with patterns of trading 
documented for the US and some other markets.  Our findings in respect of UK 
trading patterns reveal a pronounced size effect with significantly less stock picking in 
larger capitalisation stocks vis-à-vis smaller stocks.  Patterns of investment in the 
AIM suggest and increase in index trading over time but higher overall levels of stock 
picking relative to the FTSE350 list.   
Our paper is structured as follows.  The next section presents an analysis of the 
theoretical motivations for and empirical evidence pertaining to stock and index 
trading and is followed by section three which describes our sample and the 
methodology we apply.  The fourth section outlines the results of our analysis 
together with a discussion of those results and their consistence with the extant 
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literature.  In our final section we identify some limitations of our analysis together 
with some avenues for further study, and conclude. 
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Carhart (1997) among others documents the magnitude of active vis-à-vis 
passive trading costs and notes that actively managed investment funds have tended to 
be substantially more costly for investors reducing net investment returns.2  This 
author examines persistence in fund performance for equity mutual funds in the US  
for the period 1962-93 and finds that persistence is almost completely explained by 
common stock factors and investment expenses.  Over the long term he concludes that 
there is no significant momentum effect (the benefit of continuing to hold last year’s 
winning stocks, identified by Fama and French, 1996) and that expense ratios, 
transactions costs and turnover are negatively related to mutual fund performance.4  
Essentially his findings are not supportive of the existence of significant stock 
selectivity skills among mutual fund managers for the period of his study.   
Jensen (1968) identified stock selection ability and diversification/ risk 
minimisation as separate fund management responsibilities and based on the 
Sharpe/Lintner CAPM model, examined fund managers’ ‘predictive ability’ in an 
analysis of US fund managers over the period 1945-64, the regression intercept term 
or alpha representing stock selection ability.9  His findings indicate that over the 
sample period the mean fund was unable to generate sufficient returns to cover 
trading costs and would not have outperformed a passive ‘buy and hold’ investment 
approach. 
In light of the historically poor returns to active fund management,  Gruber 
(1996) queries why investors choose to buy actively managed funds on finding that 
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active management adds value but that fund charges exceed this value added.8  
Wermers (2000) re-examines the value-added by mutual fund managers based on 
hypothetical stocks-only funds and concludes that while such funds outperformed the 
CRSP on average for his study period with higher turnover funds doing relatively 
better, the net effect of transactions costs and non-stock holdings resulted in his 
sample funds underperforming a passive indexing approach by 1% per annum on 
average.17  Grinblatt and Titman (1989, 1993) report mutual fund out performance 
consistent with Wermers’ (2000) findings but their findings with respect to the 
substantial drag on net returns of actively managed fund transactions costs are 
consistent with Wermers.6  A useful comment on the active versus passive debate is 
provided in Malkiel (2003).13   
In summary the body of literature seems to indicate that active management 
does not justify the fees typically charged for this service.  If the benefits of active 
fund management are consistently negligible or even negative, passive investment is 
surely more constructive for investors and one would expect to observe indexing as 
the dominant investment philosophy if markets truly are efficient.  To date the main 
body of literature relating to the prevalence of active versus passive investors is not 
well developed.  Such literature as exists regarding persistence in performance, 
efficient markets and mutual fund performance have been carried out in the US and 
typically on US data.   
A Bhattacharya and Galpin (2005) paper incorporates an important contribution 
to the debate by developing a metric to measure indexing.1  These authors collected 
share volume and shares outstanding data from CRSP for NYSE, AMEX and 
NASDAQ listed stocks for the period July 1962 – December 2004, and for 43 other 
markets around the world from DataStream for the period January 1995 – July 2004, 
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in order to conduct cross sectional monthly regressions.  The 43 non-US markets are 
classified as emerging markets (22) and developed markets (21).  A key finding is that 
there appears to be more stock picking in emerging markets (maximum 63%) vis-à-
vis developed markets (maximum 45%), which result is intuitive given the greater 
coverage of stocks and sounder institutional arrangements in developed markets.  
Important exceptions are Germany which appears to have more stock picking than 
one would expect for a developed country (maximum 71%) and Russia which appears 
to have surprisingly little stock picking (maximum 35%).  Notably the maximum 
proportion of stock picking was lowest in the US with 29% and greatest in China 
(maximum 80%).  A further key finding is that stock picking appears to be declining 
systematically around the world, with this decline being most pronounced in emerging 
markets although the US data reveal a decline to a low of 24% in the 2000s compared 
to an average level of stock picking in the late 1960s of 60%.  
When these authors examine their US data more minutely some further trends 
and patterns are apparent.  Consistent with the practicalities of indexing, the practice 
is significantly more extensive for S+P 500 vis-à-vis non-S+P 500 stocks although 
indexing appears to be gaining in popularity for both categories of shares.  Share 
turnover is also relatively greater for the larger non-S+P 500 shares.  At all points 
examined, indexing seems to be greater for NYSE-listed vis-à-vis AMEX-listed 
stocks and indexing in the NASDAQ resembled that in the AMEX in the 1980s but 
more closely resembled trading in the NYSE post-2000 at which time stock picking in 
NASDAQ-traded stocks started to decline noticeably.  There has been a consistent 
decline in stock-picking over time in all three markets however, and an apparent size 
effect as there seems to be greater indexing in larger stocks across all the US markets 
examined.  Furthermore, partitioning by age, the authors find less stock picking in 
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older stocks vis-à-vis young firm stocks.  Again stock-picking is observed to be in 
decline across firms of all ages and across the 10 Fama and French (1997) industry 
classifications, although the maximum proportion of stock picking is higher in 
telecommunications which the authors describe as ‘exciting’ relative to ‘boring’ 
utilities.   
Bhattacharya and Galpin hypothesise that analysts have expertise in identifying 
mispriced stocks and pick stocks that others should pick later.1  Using IBES data on 
analyst following they find, inconsistent with their priors, that investors conduct more 
stock picking in stocks that analysts do not pick and hypothesise that this seems 
plausible if by undertaking and acting on their own research analysts consequently 
reduce the payoff to stock picking on one’s own account.  Again stock picking 
appears to be in decline across both analyst-followed and non-followed stocks with 
indexing being more pronounced in stocks followed by greater numbers of analysts.  
In light of findings that stock picking is declining across all markets and sub-
divisions of the data studied, Bhattacharya et al. question the ‘long-run steady state 
fraction of stock-pickers’ and develop a model based on firm specific risks and 
payoffs, trading costs and the market price of risk (the market Sharpe ratio) which is 
then applied to US data for the period 1964-2004.1  Their findings suggest that firm-
specific risk has been increasing over time and that stock-picking has declined in 
tandem.  At a long-run estimate of a ‘net benefit to stock-picking’ measure, they 
estimate a steady state maximum proportion of stock-picking of approximately 11%, 
at which level the authors predict that stock-picking will eventually settle in the US. 
The United Kingdom is one of the developed markets examined by Bhattacharya et al. 
(2005).1  In terms of world rankings of stock picking, the UK ranks 9th (21st) over the 
period 1995-99 (2000-04) respectively with a maximum proportion of stock picking 
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of 47% (51%) respectively.  While the estimated differential is not large, it is 
nevertheless interesting that the UK is one of very few markets in which the extent of 
indexing actually declined over that period, in consequence of which we consider that 
a fuller exploration of trading patterns in the UK might yield noteworthy findings.  
We also perceive the potential to examine more closely the role of industry, and of 
firm age or establishment in light of the existence since 1995 of trading in the UK 
Alternative Investment Market (AIM).  It is to this analysis that we now turn. 
 
III.     DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
     The main objective of our analysis here is to investigate, illustrate and explain any 
variation in the patterns of active vis-à-vis passive equity trading over the period 
1991-2005 inclusive for the FTSE350 and AIM markets, and specifically to explore 
any trends in stock-picking versus indexing for the period.  We seek to ascertain the 
extent to which trading volume is explained by stock picking in the UK, whether there 
is a size and/or industry effect in such trading and whether patterns that apply to the 
FTSE350 main list are also apparent in AIM trading.  Our methodological approach is 
based on that of Bhattacharya and Galpin (2005).1  Their metric draws on insights of 
Lo and Wang (2000) who in turn base their theoretical discussion on Tobin’s (1958) 
two-fund separation theorem.12,16  Briefly, if the two-fund separation theorem holds 
and everybody in the world indexes between a risk-free asset and a value-weighted 
proxy for the market portfolio, with no price changes between trades, share turnover 
for each stock defined as share trading volume scaled by number of shares 
outstanding, should be identical for all stocks in the portfolio.  Essentially (dollar) 
trading volume in any stock i should be entirely explained by the market 
capitalization of that stock.  Regressing share trading volume on number of shares 
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outstanding for each stock would yield a beta of 1 and an R2 =1 if all investment in 
the market is indexing.  To the extent that R2 differs from 1, there has been a 
deviation from indexing which could reflect either stock picking or alternative 
investment strategies such as indexing to an alternative market index, hedging 
derivative positions etc.   Thus R2 in the following regression  
 
       iiii NOSHLnVOLLn εβα ++= )()(                [1] 
 
represents the proportion/extent of indexing in a given market and (1-R2) represents 
the maximum proportion of investment trading that can be explained by stock-picking.   
VOL is the monthly £ volume of shares traded scaled by market capitalisation, NOSH 
is the £ value of shares outstanding for each stock at the end of that trading month 
(adjusted for closely held shares). The intercept term α represents the log of turnover, 
and the regression coefficient β describes the relation between trading volume and 
shares outstanding.  The error term may be interpreted as a measure of abnormal 
volume at the firm-level.  It is important to note that our stock-picking metric 
represents the maximum volume of shares traded that can be explained by stock 
picking, as it implicitly assumes that investors are indexers or not.  (R2 will differ 
from 1 if agents either pick individual stocks in which to invest or alternatively index 
to tailored portfolios such as hedge funds of funds or exchange traded funds, which 
latter have enjoyed increasing popularity in recent times.)  The metric does not 
distinguish between stock picking and the activities of hedge funds and funds of funds 
for example.  However we consider that its appeal lies in its simplicity, 
understandability and ease of computation, requiring neither a highly quantitative 
background nor appreciation of complex statistics for its comprehension.  It yields a 
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measure which by default describes the extent of indexing in the market and in 
consequence allows us to infer trends in approaches to investment over the period 
studied.   
Our analysis of the nature of stock trading activity in the UK centres on the 
FTSE350 list which we consider offers a happy medium between the small number of 
stocks that constitute the FT100 main list and the larger FTALLSH index which 
would present considerable data challenges. For comparative purposes we also 
analyse trading patterns for the newer AIM market which commenced trading in June, 
1995 and which offers smaller firms an opportunity to access capital without the 
rigorous listing requirements of a full listing. Companies that list and enjoy share 
trading on the AIM are typically smaller and younger than those on the main list.  For 
each month over the period January 1991 – December 2005 we obtain (aggregate) 
trading volume and NOSH data (at month end) for every firm in our sample and 
conduct monthly regressions as in equation [1] above.  To be included in our sample a 
share must be on ordinary common share and be listed in its own country.  There was 
some variation in the constituents of the 350 list, some companies disappearing over 
time and others not having obtained a listing until after the sample period 
commenced.  We select at random 210 companies on which to base our analysis, 
representing 60% of the constituent firms at any point in time.  These data were 
obtained from DataStream.  For our size analysis we partition our sample companies 
into quintiles according to market capitalisation for every month, quintile 1 (5) 
containing the largest (smallest) stocks by market value respectively and we conduct 
difference of means tests on (1-R2) measures to assess any size effect.  For our 
industry analysis we base our analysis on the DataStream industry classifications (25).  
Some categories had fewer than 4 companies so we reclassified these firms under the 
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‘other’ classification, resulting in 17 distinct groupings for the FTSE350 sample.  
Codes ranging from 1-17 inclusive were accorded to each firm to facilitate our 
differentiation by industry.  We do not seek to explore the existence of a size or 
industry effect in our AIM sample for which just 10 years of data were available 
January 1996 – December 2005 and we omit the period 1 June 1995 – 31 December 
1995 to allow for market settling in this introductory trading period. Our metrics of 
key interest are R2 and by extension (1-R2) which represent the proportion off 
indexing (maximum proportion of stock picking) respectively, though the intercept 
term which represents log of turnover also provides some useful hints about the 
absolute volume of trade in the various data sets.  We conduct the Ryan-Joiner test of 
normality and the Durbin-Watson test for autocorrelation and find no non-stationarity 
in our data. Skewness is predictably a feature as turnover is necessarily bounded by 0 
which induces positive skewness. We employ the White test for heteroskedasticity, 
again this is not a feature of our data though it might plausibly have been present in 
such time-series data.  In consequence we utilise OLS and base our tests of 
significance on parametric P-values and (Fischer) F-statistics, and our t-statistics are 
of the 2-sided test of the null β=1.   
As the error term in our cross-sectional regression represents a measure of 
abnormal volume at the firm level, we obtain monthly returns for each firm over the 
sample period from DataStream and relate them to this abnormal volume measure as 
follows: 
iitit AVolR εβα ++= )(            [2] 
 
where Rit is the firm-level return for firm i in month t, AVolit is abnormal volume 
from equation [1], α, β are regression coefficients and ei the error term, to explore 
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whether abnormal volume might have explanatory or predictive power for returns.  
Table I below describes our data for both FTSE350 and AIM companies at 31 
December 2005, the end point of our sample period.   
 
Table 1 about here 
 
 
Clearly and unsurprisingly the mean FTSE350 firm is larger, enjoys significantly 
greater aggregate monthly trading volume and has significantly greater numbers of 
shares outstanding than its AIM counterpart.  There is no minimum market 
capitalisation requirement for an AIM listing and the FTSE350 market has 
substantially greater market liquidity. 
 
IV. RESULTS 
Table 2 presents the results of applying equation [1] above to our FTSE350 data, 
where R2 (1-R2) represent the proportions of indexing (maximum stock-picking) 
respectively.  Our sample period pre(post)-dates that of Bhattacharya and Galpin 
(2005) by some 4 (1) years.1  We are unclear about the specific stocks that constitute 
their UK list so that comparisons are somewhat problematic other than in general 
import and theme. 
Table 2 about here 
 
Throughout our beta value is greater than 1 at the 1% level so that while volume was 
approximately linear in NOSH an increase in shares outstanding resulted in a greater 
percentage change in the volume of trading with this effect being more pronounced 
through time.  Our F-statistics suggest that the regression is highly significant in every 
period studied.  R2, the measure of proportionate indexing shows a clear trend 
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upwards and there is a corresponding decline in the extent of stock-picking and other 
non-indexing trades, which accords both with our priors and with evidence for the US 
and other markets documented by Bhattacharya and Galpin (2005).1  Our mean 
(maximum proportion of) stock picking at 31% appears lower than the median 
reported by Bhattacharya et al. of 49% and we report a systematic decline in stock 
picking over time while Bhattacharya reports a slight increase in stock-picking for the 
later years in his sample (to 51% for the 2000-4 period).1  Our difference of means 
tests indicate that the level of indexing was significantly lower in 1991 relative to both 
the average over 1991-2005 (t-stat 21.62, p-value 0.000) and to the level recorded for 
2005 at the end of our sample period (t-stat 24.61, p-value 0.000).  These findings are 
consistent with those of Bhattacharya et al. (2005) who document a decline from 60% 
to 24% over the period 1960s-2000s for US markets.1  Figure 1 below highlights this 
pronounced decline in stock picking over time for the FTSE350:  
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
Table 3 below presents the findings of our size analysis for quintiles of the FTSE350 
where quintile 1 (5) represents the largest (smallest) stocks by market capitalisation 
respectively and metrics are mean values for the 1991-2005 period.  For all quintiles 
the model statistics indicate significance at the 1% level and there is a clear size effect 
evident in the data with indexing being significantly greater in larger stocks vis-à-vis 
smaller ones.  Difference of means tests confirm this size effect, (t-stat 22.05; p-value 
0.000), and also that within each quintile there has been a systematic and significant 
decline in stock picking over time, a pattern that is evident in Figure 2 below. 
 
Figure 2 about here 
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Table 3 about here 
These findings are consistent with Bhattacharya and Galpin (2005), who document a 
similar size effect and time trend for US stocks.1  We are unsurprised with these data, 
stock picking tends to be more prevalent in markets where there is less public 
disclosure of stock-specific information and analyst following (and consequent 
publication of price-sensitive information) is greater for larger capitalisation stocks.  
For our industry analysis we partition our FTSE350 stocks into the DataStream 
classifications as discussed in Section Three above.  The mean number of companies 
per industry was 12.35 with a maximum (minimum) of 19 (4) respectively.  Table 4 
presents our findings with respect to these groupings for the period 1991-2005: 
 
Table 4 about here 
 
There is considerable variation in the relative dominance of each investment 
philosophy across industry type with stock picking in the Electrical and Utility 
(Chemical and Pharmaceutical) industries being significantly greater (less) than the 
mean.  While not reported here, our (1-R2) measures indicate a systematic decline in 
stock picking over the period studied for every industrial grouping.  To an extent our 
findings are consistent with those of Bhattacharya and Galpin who report greater 
indexing in the ‘boring’ utility sector as do we, however we find no ‘exciting’ 
telecoms effect, stock picking in this UK sector having fallen over time rather than the 
reverse which appears to have been the US experience.   
If analysts improve the information environment of the stocks they research and 
pick, thus reducing the benefits of stock picking, it seems intuitive that the returns to 
information gathering and in consequence stock picking will be greater in stocks that 
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have less analyst following.  In the UK stocks in the FTSE350 have widespread 
following but this is much less the case in AIM-listed stocks which tend to be smaller, 
younger, start-up enterprises without the trading history or visibility of larger stocks.  
Table 5 reports our indexing (non-indexing) metrics for AIM-listed stocks for the 
period 1996-2005 inclusive, the AIM having commenced trading only in June 1995. 
 
Table 5 about here 
 
 
In 1996, the first full year of trading in AIM-listed stocks thin trading would likely be 
a feature of the exchange and the concept of indexing substantially premature – 
formal indexing essentially became possible only from 01/1999 when approximately 
320 firms were listed though AIM firm numbers were 500 from 2001.  For the period 
as a whole, mean indexing is increasing albeit 2000 saw somewhat of a resurgence of 
the stock picking practice, which effect is likely due to the popularity of high-
technology and start-up stocks at the time, a large number of which would have been 
listed on the AIM.  Only towards the end of our sample period does volume traded 
approach linearity with shares outstanding, in the earlier years of the exchange’s 
existence, volume traded fell substantially short of outstanding shares.  When we 
compare indexing (non-indexing) in the FTSE350 with the AIM (for the period 1996-
2005) our difference of means tests indicate that indexing was significantly greater 
(lower) in the FTSE350 (AIM) stocks overall and in each calendar year, and our 
intercepts suggest greater turnover in FTSE350 shares but more trading in larger AIM 
stocks vis-à-vis smaller ones.  At the end of our sample period indexing in the 
FTSE350 averaged 79.5% compared with 45.8% for the AIM.  From a practical 
perspective (and indexing is the practical manifestation or implementation of the 
tenets of modern portfolio theory) indexing is of course far easier for the FTSE350 
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stocks and would not have been possible before 1999 for the AIM.  However both 
groups indicate a systematic trend upwards in indexing at the expense of stock-
picking, which is more pronounced in the AIM, possibly because stock picking started 
at a substantially greater level, also because the decline in stock picking for the 
FTSE350, for which we have a longer time series of data, pre-dates this comparative 
period.  It remains to be seen whether levels of stock-picking for these exchanges will 
converge over time or whether there is always likely to be somewhat less indexing in 
the AIM vis-à-vis the FTSE350, which pattern has been observed for the NASDAQ 
relative to the NYSE for the US market.  There are substantial tax breaks available to 
investors that buy and hold AIM-listed stocks, which provide a disincentive to more 
active trading in individual shares.  Figure 3 below depicts these trading patterns for 
UK markets for the period 1996-2005: 
 
Figure 3 about here 
 
 
In summary, we report here a significant decline in stock-picking for both FTSE350 
and AIM markets over time, which results are robust to size and industry sector, and 
in general small capitalisation stocks are shown to attract greater stock picking 
activity than larger capitalisation stocks.  While we do not undertake any systematic 
analysis of an abnormal trading volume association with firm returns, we identify this 
area as potentially yielding interesting research findings moving forward. 
 
V. SUMMARY 
In efficient markets asset prices fully reflect all available firm-specific 
information and it should not be possible to beat the market other than by chance.  If 
asset prices do not reflect all relevant information, it may be possible to earn superior 
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returns by undertaking research to identify value-relevant firm information and taking 
action thereon.  The purpose of this study was to examine the pattern of active versus 
passive trading in UK equities over the period 1991-2005 inclusive.  Our metric to 
analyse trading activity and volumes on the UK FTSE350 and AIM markets draws on 
the two fund separation theorem (Lo and Wang, 2000; Bhattacharya and Galpin, 
2005), and we explore industrial and size-based effects.12,1  Our findings indicate that 
active stock picking has been consistently declining in the UK market over the period 
studied for all markets, size quintiles and in virtually every industrial sector, although 
the AIM did see a brief resurgence of stock picking around 2000-1 at the height of the 
dot-com investment bubble.  Moreover, trading patterns in the larger capitalisation 
FTSE350 list reveal a pronounced size effect with significantly less stock picking in 
larger capitalisation stocks vis-à-vis smaller stocks.  Patterns of investment in the 
AIM suggest an increase in index trading over time but higher overall levels of stock 
picking relative to the FTSE350.   This is likely due to the shorter history of the AIM 
and the characteristics of stocks traded thereon; however it will be interesting to 
observe whether trading patterns converge with those of the FTSE350 as has been 
observed for the NASDAQ vis-à-vis the NYSE markets, when we have a longer time 
series of data for the AIM.  Our results are not especially surprising and are largely 
consistent with those of Bhattacharya and Galpin (2005) although we do report a level 
of stock picking for our FTSE350 that is substantially less than that which BG report 
for their undefined UK market.1   If our constituent stocks are on average larger than 
theirs, taken in conjunction with our pronounced size effect there may be a resolution 
of the differential here.  We fail to find any well-defined ‘excitement/boredom’ factor 
in patterns of industrial trading, though we report the greatest relative extent of 
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indexing in the Chemical and Pharmaceutical sector which is characterised in the UK 
by relatively small numbers of large capitalisation stocks.    
The evolution of the estimated stock picking impact over time is an issue which 
merits some consideration.  The period covered by our study spans several cycles in 
the market from recession through recovery and expansion and back to recession from 
which a further recovery eventually materialised in the early years of this century.  
Over the period, many economic and geo-political events occurred which may well 
have influenced investor behaviour for which our statistics proxy.  Throughout that 
period there has been a pronounced and consistent decline in active stock-picking at 
the expense of passive investment, and we remind ourselves that our stock-picking 
metric includes all non-indexing behaviour.  Essentially and notwithstanding 
developments such as the introduction of ETFs and the increasing activity of hedge 
funds, active investment appears to be in decline.  Whether this decline continues or 
whether stock picking will eventually settle at some ‘long run steady state level’ 
remains to be seen.  Was this level, if it emerges, to be significantly lower than the 
mean level we report at the end of our sample, such a development would have 
serious implications for financial activity in The City and for a fund management 
industry which has exhibited unprecedented growth in the past decade.   
We recognise the simplistic nature of the BG metric we compute in respect of 
stock picking in that it essentially measures all ‘non-indexing’ investment behaviour.1 
An interesting avenue for further study involves a more granular exploration of the 
impact if any of Exchange Traded Funds on investors’ decision choices and whether 
this relatively low-cost investment approach which amplifies the net returns 
differential between indexing vis-à-vis active investment has substantially hastened 
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the observed decline in stock-picking.  These are themes which we hope to pursue 
moving forward.   
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Table I: Descriptive Statistics 
Market    FTSE350   AIM 
No. of Companies      210     500 
Mean MV £m   6,778.5   31.3 
Mean Volume 000s   150.75    3.69 
Mean NOSH 000s   1205.55   155.76 
 
Variables   Ln(VO) Ln(NOSH) Ln(VO) Ln(NOSH) 
No of obs.  37800  37800  59760  59760 
Mean  10.251  12.814  5.762  10.451 
Median  10.246  12.777  5.929  10.360 
SE (Mean)  0.009  0.007  0.01  0.007 
Std. Deviation 1.605  1.264  2.539  1.53 
Minimum  1.569  8.509  2.302  2.303 
Maximum  16.56  18.04  14.17  17.52 
Skewness  -0.02  0.26  -0.31  0.01 
Kurtosis  2.96  3.09  2.88  3.17 
Durbin-Watson 1.87  1.91  1.89  1.88 
Ryan-Joiner  0.999  0.997  0.997  0.996 
MV=Market Capitalisation; Volume=aggregate volume of shares traded per month; 
NOSH=number of shares outstanding at end of calendar month, statistics presented 
are averages across all shares in each list respectively at 31 December, 2005. 
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Table 2: (Maximum Proportion of) Stock Picking in the FTSE350 
Year   R2 (1-R2)       F-stat Beta      P-value 
1991-2005  69.1   30.9       505.89 1.09       0.000 
     1991  53.9   46.1       158.62 1.01       0.000  
     1992  52.7       47.3       165.05 1.03       0.000 
     1993  60.1   39.9        234.9 1.02       0.000 
     1994  61.4   38.6        256.18 1.02       0.000  
     1995  59.1   40.9        236.67 1.03       0.000  
     1996  64.2   35.8        298.55 1.06       0.000 
     1997  67.4   32.6        372.81 1.08       0.000 
     1998  67.0   33.0        393.4 1.06       0.000 
     1999  72.5   27.5        525.17 1.11       0.000 
     2000  78.3   21.7        737.91 1.12       0.000 
     2001  78.3   21.7        764.16 1.16       0.000 
     2002  82.0   18.3        953.14 1.19       0.000 
     2003  81.1   18.9        895.42 1.19       0.000 
     2004  79.2   20.8        789.05 1.16       0.000 
     2005  79.5   20.5        807.28 1.12       0.000 
Model: iiii NOSHLnVOLLn εβα ++= )()(  
Vol = £ volume of shares traded; NOSH = number of shares outstanding; measures 
are mean annual results based on monthly regressions described by the model. 
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Figure 1: Stock Picking in the FTSE350 1991-2005. 
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Figure 2: (Maximum Proportion of) Stock Picking in the FTSE350 1991-2005. 
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Table 3: (Maximum Proportion of) Stock-Picking in the FTSE350 by Market 
Capitalisation, 1991-2005. 
 
Quintile R2   (1-R2)  F-stat      Beta P-value 
(1991-2005)   
1 74.61   25.39         160.89      1.06 0.000  
 2 60.03   39.97  75.78      1.06 0.000 
 3 65.25   34.75  82.83      1.06 0.000 
 4 45.70   54.30  43.53      0.94 0.000 
 5 48.70   51.30  40.36      1.12 0.000 
 
Model: iiii NOSHLnVOLLn εβα ++= )()(  
 Vol = £ volume of shares traded; NOSH = number of shares outstanding; measures 
are mean annual results based on monthly regressions described by the model. 
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Table 4: (Maximum Proportion of) Stock Picking in the FTSE350 by Industry 
Industry   R2   (1-R2) Beta    F-stat     P-value   Rank 
Electrical + Utilities  29.46    70.54 0.72     734.15   0.000 1 
Real Estate   44.19    55.81 1.65     284.18   0.000 2 
Equity Investment  48.88    51.12 0.74     146.41   0.000 3 
Other*   51.0    49.0  1.00     102.58   0.000 4 
Telecoms   56.84    43.16 0.60      124.0    0.000 5 
Aero Defence  57.40    42.60 0.80       68.28   0.000 6 
Computers   59.63    40.37 0.82     913.31   0.000 7 
Food, Drugs, Retail  62.32    37.68 0.95     167.34   0.000 8 
Food Producers  64.32    35.69 1.30       76.67   0.000 9 
Household G+S  67.56    32.44 1.31     191.87   0.000 10 
Support Services  69.62    30.38 1.27     350.05   0.000 11 
Engineering, Transport 72.25    27.75 0.90     133.34   0.000 12 
Travel + Leisure  77.13      22.87 1.19     238.64   0.000 13 
Insurance   77.54    22.46 1.25        78.40   0.000 14 
Media   77.77    22.23 1.33     263.41   0.000 15 
Banks + Gen Finance 78.02    21.98 1.18     120.43   0.000 16 
Chemical, Pharmaceutical 83.26    16.71 0.91      205.91  0.000 17
    
Model: iiii NOSHLnVOLLn εβα ++= )()(  
Vol = £ volume of shares traded; NOSH = number of shares outstanding; measures 
are mean annual results based on monthly regressions described by the model.  Other* 
classification includes 40 companies from the following industries; auto and parts, 
beverages, tobacco, Personnel, H/C and Services, Mining, Construction, for which 
there were fewer than 4 firm-industry observations. 
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Table 5: (Maximum Proportion of) Stock Picking in the AIM 1996-2005. 
Period   R2 (1-R2)      F-stat Beta    P-value 
1996-2005   23.0   77.0      164.80 0.754     0.000 
    1996     1.6   98.4        10.79 0.192     0.591 
    1997   24.6   75.5       38.85 0.788     0.000 
    1998   20.3   79.7       47.96 0.73     0.000 
    1999   24.2   75.8       79.74 0.851     0.000 
    2000   16.0   84.0       76.31 0.626     0.050 
    2001   16.3   83.7       90.83 0.686     0.000 
    2002   17.0   83.0       87.99 0.716     0.000 
    2003   25.0   75.0      135.32 0.851     0.000  
    2004   39.1   60.9      233.48 1.043     0.000 
    2005   45.8   54.2      292.25 1.156     0.000 
Model: iiii NOSHLnVOLLn εβα ++= )()(  
Vol = £ volume of shares traded; NOSH = number of shares outstanding; measures 
are mean annual results based on monthly regressions described by the model. 
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Figure 3: (Maximum Proportion of) Stock-Picking in the FTSE350, AIM for the 
period 1996-2005 inclusive. 
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Globalization has precipitated movement of output and employment between regions. We examine 
factors related to corporate financial distress across three continents. Using a multidimensional 
definition of financial distress we test three hypotheses to explain financial distress using historical 
financial data. A null hypothesis of a single global model was rejected in favor of a fully relaxed 
model which created individual financial distress models for each region. This result suggests that 
despite other indications of worldwide convergence, international differences in accounting rules, 
lending practices, managements skill levels, and legal requirements among others has kept 
















As companies move production offshore they face a growing risk of supply-chain 
disruption caused by the possible financial distress of foreign suppliers. Receiving a 12 month early 
warning of impending supplier difficulties provides buying companies the opportunity to either 
remediate the supplier’s condition or to contract with another supplier. The choice of actions may 
depend upon the capacity utilization in that particular sector or the availability of other suppliers.   
A supplier early warning system for manufacturing firms is analogous to bankruptcy models that 
alert lenders or investors that an offending firm is unable to service its long-term debt.  Unlike 
investment analysts for whom obtaining advance warning of bankruptcy is sufficient, corporate 
purchasers require advance warning of supplier financial distress, a condition which normally 
precedes bankruptcy by some period of time.  
There has been substantial bankruptcy prediction research; in contrast, few analysts have 
created models to forecast financial distress. In this globally connected world it is essential that 
there be a framework for evaluating financial distress risk. Platt and Platt (2006) recently 
developed a financial distress model for U.S. based companies that demonstrated an ability to 
predict the onset of financial distress for a sample of companies in manufacturing industries. No 
similar model exists for companies in other global regions. Globalization blurs international 
differences between countries. Are these similarities limited to areas such as technological 
adoption, arts and culture, and cuisine? Or, are business practices essentially universal now. This 
paper looks at one area, financial distress, where similarities may exist between global regions. 
Three global regions are considered: Asia (including Australia), Europe and the US. Profound 
differences between regions in accounting rules, legal practices, environmental laws, and business 
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practices among others may limit the degree of convergence in the area of financial distress. This 
paper explores that question by developing a financial distress model across three global regions.  
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Bankruptcy has been rigorously studied since the pioneering work of Beaver (1966). 
Altman (1968) and Ohlson (1980) accelerated interest in the field by applying standard statistical 
techniques to predict bankruptcy outcomes. More recent innovations (Altman, Marco and Varetto, 
1994; Yang, Platt and Platt, 1999; and Shumway, 2001) have extended the field by introducing 
newer methodologies. While there are variations across models, factors that often are found to be 
predictive of bankruptcy filings include debt load, profitability, liquidity, operating performance 
and growth.  
A company either files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection from creditors because it finds 
itself in a difficult financial, operating or legal situation or is forced to do so by creditors because 
the firm’s  performance is so deficient that it can no longer honor commitments made to lenders. 
Regardless of the initiating event, companies in bankruptcy must work through the courts to 
restructure their operations and/or financial structure to emerge from the process as a viable 
company. Companies in financial distress, by contrast, are not yet so severely disabled that legal 
recourse is required.  Often, companies in financial distress do take steps to remedy their precarious 
situation, including hiring turnaround managers, disposing of assets, and improving working capital 
management (See Hofer, 1980).  
The literature focusing on financial distress tends to examine financial restructurings (John, 
Lang and Netter, 1992; Gilson, John & Lang, 1990; Wruck, 1990; Brown, James & Mooradian, 
1992, and Asquith, Gernter and Scharfstein , 1994) or management turnover during distress 
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(Gilson, 1989).  John et al. (1992) note that failing firm managers are replaced despite their 
delivering performance on par with their peers; in contrast, Asquith, et al. (1994) observe that 
distressed firm’s managers underperform peers. Inconsistencies between studies may result from 
using samples drawn over different time periods or comprised of different firms. 
Most prediction studies with the words “financial distress” in their title actually model 
bankruptcy, see (Frydman, Altman and Kao, 1985; Theodossiou, Kahya and Philippatos, 1996; Lin, 
Ko and Blocher, 1999). True models of financial distress are far less common [See Schipper 
(1977); Lau (1987); Hill et al. (1996); Platt and Platt, (2002)]. Schipper (1977) examined private 
colleges with imbalanced finances, Lau (1987) and Hill et al. (1996) moved beyond just 
bankruptcy to consider multiple states of corporate decline including financial distress, and Platt 
and Platt (2002) modeled financial distress among auto suppliers. More recently Platt and Platt, 
(2006) built a multi-industry model of financial distress for U.S. companies. Their most interesting 
finding was that bankruptcy and financial distress are not simply two sequential steps in the same 
process. Instead companies experience financial distress following poor operating results or as a 
consequence of external forces while bankruptcy is an action companies take to protect their assets 
often as a result of balance sheet issues.   
Perhaps the reason that financial distress is studied less frequently than bankruptcy is that 
financial distress lacks a specific definition while formal bankruptcy, by contrast, takes place in a 
court of law and has a definite start date. It is unclear when financial distress begins or ends or 
even, for that matter, what it is. Moreover, there are various degrees of financial distress ranging 
from companies bordering on bankruptcy to those that are less troubled. Researchers have adopted 
a variety of financial distress definitions. Some are multidimensional so that only severely 
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distressed firms are included while others are more narrowly defined. The best known academic 
descriptions of financial distress are: 
• Evidence of layoffs, restructurings, or missed dividend payments, used by Lau (1987). 
• A low interest coverage ratio, used by Asquith, Gertner and Scharfstein (1994). 
• Cash flow less than current maturities of long-term debt, used by Whitaker (1999). 
• The change in equity price or a negative EBIT, used by John, Lang, and Netter (1992). 
• Negative net income before special items, used by Hofer (1980). 
 
 Platt and Platt (2006) adopt a multidimensional interpretation of financial distress in which 
they denote a firm as financially distressed only when it meets three of the criteria noted above. 
These three measures are: 
 Negative EBITDA interest coverage (similar to Asquith, Gertner and Scharfstein 
(1994)). 
 Negative EBIT (similar to John, Lang, and Netter (1992)). 
 Negative net income before special items (similar to Hofer (1980)). 
To be included as financially distressed a company needed to fail all three tests in two consecutive 
years. Companies classified as not financially distressed did not meet any of the three criteria in the 
two consecutive years. Interestingly, the negative EBITDA to interest coverage and the negative 
EBIT measures are less correlated than one might expect.  
All three screens are correlated, but not perfectly, with correlation coefficients ranging from 
0.38 (not significant) to 0.98 (highly significant). As a result, by using the intersection of three 
separate financial distress definitions fewer firms are labeled as financially distressed than would 
be the case with any single screen (Platt and Platt, 2006). That is, it is less likely that a non-
financially distressed company is labeled as financially distressed when the intersection of three 
screens is employed. The use of three screens provides a multidimensional view of which 
companies are financially distressed. This definition appeals to purchasers high up the supply-chain 
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who may be reluctant to confront a long-time supplier with an inaccurate financial distress 
accusation. 
Given the success of Platt and Platt (2006) in modeling financial distress using US 
manufacturing companies and given the exponential growth in manufacturing worldwide, this 
study examines the question of whether factors (i.e., financial ratios) found to predict financial 
distress in the US also  predict financial distress in Europe and in Asia. There are many reasons 
why it may be necessary to search for different financial ratios than those used by Platt and Platt 
(2006) to model financial distress in Europe or Asia. For example, differences in industrial 
development, technological adoption, manufacturing strategies, and access to capital markets could 
conceivably affect a firm’s financial decisions and influence its resulting financial ratios.  
This study relies on accounting information to distinguish between companies that are not 
financially distressed and those that might succumb to financial distress. Another concern is that 
differences in international accounting standards may affect our ability to characterize companies 
(See PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2001). For example, both US GAAP accounting and the 
International Accounting Standard (IAS) allow LIFO and FIFO treatment of inventories; in 
contrast, UK GAAP only allows the FIFO standard. Likewise, US GAAP accounting has four 
specific criteria used with revenue recognition while the other two accounting standards use fewer 
criteria. Accounting differences themselves will not lead to financial distress though their 
application may obfuscate international data comparisons. We controlled for this issue in two ways. 
First, we made certain that the distribution of ratios utilized in our study were similar across global 
regions. Second, qualitative (dummy) variables tested for uncontrolled regional variation.  
Our research hypothesis expressed as a null hypothesis, is: 
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H0: A global model will accurately predict financial distress in manufacturing companies in 
the US, Europe and Asia. 
The alternate hypothesis has two variations. The first is: 
Ha: A global model exists in which there are commonalities across regions in how factors 
affect financial distress though there are broad regional differences.  
The second alternate hypothesis is: 
Hb: There is no global model of financial distress. Different processes entirely explain 
financial distress in various locations.  
 Being unable to reject H0 would allow for a single explanation of how firms succumb to 
financial distress in different locations. Not being able to reject Ha, the first variation of the 
alternate explanation, would modify the single global model with differential regional intercepts 
and slopes as needed while seeking to maintain the maximum degree of similarity across regions. 
Finally, not rejecting Hb would relax all constraints so that the explanation of financial distress on 
each region would have separate factors explaining that region’s financial distress process. 
III. METHODOLOGY 
Data 
 Financial data from 1999 – 2001 for US companies were obtained from S&P’s Research 
Insight Compustat Database. Comparable data from audited financial statements for European and 
Asian companies were obtained from the S&P’s Research Insight Global Vantage Database. Only 
companies surviving throughout the three year period are included in the sample. This data was 
divided into two groups: just 1999 and then both 2000 and 2001. Methodologically we followed a 
two step procedure. In the first step, the 2000 and 2001 data were used to categorize companies by 
status: financially distressed and non-financially distressed. Companies were placed in the 
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financially distressed group when they failed three tests for financial distress in both years. By 
contrast, a company was categorized as non-financially distressed if all three metrics (EBDITDA to 
interest coverage, EBIT, and net income before special items) were positive in both 2000 and 
20001. Then financial ratios were created with the earlier data from 1999. These ratios were used in 
the second step to predict financial distress among companies (both financially distressed and non-
financially distressed) whose performance in 2000 and 2001 was reviewed in the first step. The two 
year gap between the year when companies are classified as financially distressed or not and the 
data used to explain that classification is necessary so that companies are not classified and 
modeled with the same data or ratios. Table 1 contains the composition of sample firms used to 
build the statistical models by region and industry. Table 2 contains individual items and ratios 
used to bifurcate the sample into financially distressed and non-financially distressed groups with 
the means and medians of the three screening metrics by region, financial status for the largest 
industry classifications in the sample. Table 2 demonstrates that the three metrics clearly 
differentiate between the two sample groups, non-financially distressed versus financially 
distressed companies. Like other researchers in this area, we did not track companies in years 
beyond 2001 to determine their future status.  
Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here 
 
Dependent Variable: Financial Distress Defined 
 Following Platt and Platt (2006), we adopt a multidimensional interpretation of financial 
distress in which a firm is categorized as financially distressed only when it meets all three of the 
following criteria for two consecutive years: 
 Negative EBITDA interest coverage (similar to Asquith, Gertner and Scharfstein 
(1994)). 
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 Negative EBIT (similar to John, Lang, and Netter (1992)). 
 Negative net income before special items (similar to Hofer (1980)). 
By using the intersection of three separate financial distress definitions fewer firms are labeled as 
financially distressed than would be the case with any single screen. That is, it is less likely that a 
non-financially distressed company is labeled as financially distressed when the intersection of 
three screens are employed; though, as a consequence, more financially distressed companies may 
be incorrectly described This outcome is preferred when the cost of misidentifying a non-
financially distressed company as financially distressed is higher than the alternative 
misclassification. Financially distressed firms were defined as those that had negative values for the 
three screening criteria in both 2000 and 2001. A two year approach was followed to avoid calling 
as financially distressed companies having just a single bad year. By contrast, non-financially 
distressed firms were defined as those whose three screen metrics were positive for both years.  
 
Independent Variables 
 Table 3 contains the financial ratios that were tested as independent variables for modeling 
purposes. The financial ratios represent measures of profitability, financial leverage, liquidity, 
operating efficiency and growth, all of which are factors frequently included in models predicting 
either financial distress or bankruptcy.  
Insert Table 3 about here 
A common problem in empirical studies occurs when information is drawn from companies 
across many industries in order to create a larger sample. The problem created by that decision is 
that the sample mean value of financial ratios may then vary depending on the mix of industries 
from which sample firms are drawn. In other words, another sample is likely to have different 
sample mean values and different coefficient estimates. The industry-relative framework pioneered 
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by Altman and Izan (1984) and later used and rationalized by Platt and Platt (1990, 1991) mitigates 
this problem. The industry-relative framework transforms data to be relative to the industry’s 
average value. The transformation of company ratios into industry-relative ratios is described in 
equation (1).  
100*)(' Ratio Relative-Industry ji,
jIndustryinRatioMean
rRatiosiFirm
=     (1) 
where firm i is a member of industry j and 100 adjusts percentage ratios to scalar values greater 
than 1.0. The transformation starts with a company’s ratio and then divides that quotient by the 
value of that same ratio for the average firm in the industry. The industry relative data adjustment is 
also performed in this study for each continent separately.  
 
Model Development, Specification and Comparison 
 A global model of financial distress (Model 1) is developed using financial ratios contained 
in Table 3. Companies from the three regions are pooled together. Data are drawn from a firm’s 
1999 fiscal year.1 Initially, one ratio from each group in Table 3 was selected to minimize potential 
multicollinearity. Because several variables in each category could potentially discriminate 
between the two groups of firms (financially distressed and non-financially distressed), various 
combinations of predictors across the eight categories were tested. It was expected that financial 
distress would be negatively related to profit margin, profitability, liquidity, growth from 1998 to 
1999 and operating efficiency. Alternatively, financial distress would be positively related to 
operating or financial leverage. 2  
                                                 
1 Data from 1998 were also collected to allow measurement of growth rates from 1998 to 1999. 
2 This approach is analogous to the well-known paradigm used by many researchers to predict bankruptcy with prior 
year data. In our case, instead of bankrupt companies we use those that are severely financially distressed as defined by 
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The world-wide modeling process began with the variables found to be statistically 
significant determinants of financial distress for US companies in Platt and Platt (2006). Using an 
iterative process, a core group of predictors was developed to which additional predictors were 
added individually. The core set of variables expands as additional factors yield a coefficient with 
the expected sign, statistical significance, and improved classification accuracy. This approach 
concentrates on the explanatory power of variables. The selection of the final set of financial and 
operating ratios was based on their conformity to a priori sign expectations, the statistical 
significance of estimated parameters and on model classification results.  
 Model 1 which assumes a single world-wide financial distress prediction framework is 
compared to a global model that also contains region dummy variables as well as interaction terms 
of the dummy variables with the financial ratios contained in the model. The model with the 
additional variables is referred to as Model 2.  To test which model specification is best, we use the 
F-test for nested models (Kmenta, 1986, p. 594).  In effect, the two competing models can be 
characterized as: 
 Model 1: y = X1ß1 + ε 
 Model 2: y = X1ß1 + X2ß2 + ε 
Where X1 is the set of factors contained in the global model and X2 is the set of region dummies 
and the interaction terms which when added to the global model creates Model 2. The null 
hypothesis states that ß2 = 0; alternatively, ß2 ≠ 0. If the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, then the 
global model is the best specification regardless of global location.  However, if the null hypothesis 
is rejected, then different specifications for each region is best. 
                                                                                                                                                                 
a two-year three-screen approach. That is, the technique looks for characteristics in prior year data that distinguishes 
between future severely financially distressed and non-financially distressed companies.  
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Model building utilizes logit regression analysis because of its flexibility and statistical 
power in modeling (McFadden, 1984; Lo, 1986). A non-linear maximum-likelihood estimation 
procedure obtained estimates of the parameters of the logit model shown in equation (2). 
 
]exp  [1
1 P )XB   . . .  XB  XB  (B -i inni22i110 +++++
=       (2) 
 
where: Pi = probability of financial distress of the ith firm,  
 Xij = jth variable of the ith firm, and 
 Bj = estimated coefficient for the jth variable. 
 
With logit regression, it is possible to test the significance of individual estimated coefficients 
which is not the case with other estimation methods such as multiple discriminate analysis.  
 
IV. RESULTS 
Table 4 presents the means of three key financial ratios by region, financial status and 
industry. In the interest of brevity, only the three largest industries are presented: chemicals and 
allied products, industrial machinery and equipment and electrical and electronic equipment. Table 
4 shows that companies categorized as financially distressed not only have lower cash flow to sales 
and lower EBITDA to total assets, but the average ratio is negative across all three regions and 
across all three industries. By contrast, firms not categorized as financially distressed have higher 
ratios.  
The pattern for total debt to total assets is not as easily described. For all three industries in 
the US, financially distressed firms had more debt, on average, than reasonably non-financially 
distressed firms. However, in Europe and in Asia, mixed results were found. In some industries, 
non-financially distressed firms were found to have more debt than financially distressed firms. 
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Thus, it is more difficult to make a generalizable statement about debt. It may be that in these 
regions healthier firms can attract more debt because of their financial strength, whereas weaker 
firms cannot and thus show less debt. This somewhat counter intuitive result may be characteristic 
of the chemical industry outside of the US where non-financially distressed firms are able to 
borrow more to invest in their substantial plant and facilities. 
Insert Table 4 about here 
The global model (Model 1), shown in Table 5, contains seven variables, one variable each 
representing profit margin (CF/Sales), profitability (EBITADA/TA), liquidity (CA/CL), operating 
efficiency (Sales/WC), and operating leverage (DA/EBIT). There are also two financial leverage 
variables (short term: NP/TA and total: TD/TA). With financially distressed firms arbitrarily coded 
as 1, negative (positive) coefficients describe an inverse (direct) relationship with financial distress. 
It is not unreasonable to expect a priori that higher cash flow margins (CF/Sales), greater 
profitability (EBITDA/TA) and greater working capital turnover (Sales/WC) reduce the risk of 
financial distress; whereas, higher operating leverage (DA /EBIT) and higher financial leverage 
(short term: NP/TA, total: TD/TA) are likely to increase the risk of financial distress. The 
remaining variable, liquidity (CA/CL), is more difficult to assess. On the one hand finance 
textbooks argue that having more liquidity is associated with improved corporate health. On the 
other hand, a global company that holds too many of its assets (relative to its current liabilities) as 
current assets is reducing its investment in more profitable fixed assets which may reduce its 
profitability. Over investment in current assets relative to current liabilities may increase the risk of 
financial distress.  
Insert Table 5 about here 
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All estimated coefficient receive the expected signs. The current ratio receives a positive 
coefficient which says that overinvestment in current assets increases the risk of financial distress. 
Platt and Platt (1991a) found that companies with too many of their assets invested in fixed assets 
have higher financial distress risk. Our new finding supports the earlier discovery by saying that 
companies must not over invest in either fixed assets or current assets; there is an appropriate 
investment level for each.  
Further, all but one estimated coefficient is statistically significant beyond the .05 level. The 
measure of operating leverage, DA/EBIT, is not significant, but was retained in the model because 
it improved the percentage of firms correctly classified, both overall and for financially distressed 
firms. 
The global financial distress prediction model had an overall correct classification rate of 
94.5 percent, as shown in Panel B of Table 5. For the distressed group, the model correctly 
classified 82.1 percent of companies; for the non-distressed group, 96.4 percent of companies. 
 
Extending the Model to Other Regions 
 To test whether the factors predictive of financial distress are the same across the three 
regions in question, we added two region dummy variables to Model 1 as well as interaction terms 
between the two dummy variables and the seven variables included in the model, yielding 23 total 
predictors in Model 2.  Table 6 presents the Model 2 results, as well as the results for Model 1 for 
comparison purposes.  
Insert Table 6 about here 
 Estimated coefficient comparisons between the two models show that all main effects 
continue to have the same relationship to financial distress except for DA/EBIT. In Model 2, 
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DA/EBIT is now marginally significant, but with a negative relationship to financial distress; that 
is, the greater the operating leverage (use of fixed assets), the lower the likelihood of financial 
distress.  Further, two variables, NP/TA and Sales/WC, are not statistically significant as main 
effects, but do impact financial distress as interaction terms with one of the region dummy 
variables.  
 An F-statistic is used to test whether the additional dummy variables and interaction terms 
contain significant real explanatory power. Again, the null hypothesis states that region locale has 
no effect on the model, thus ß2 = 0 where ß2 represents the additional variables found in Model 2. 






/( )K n K K
SSE SSE KF




        (3) 
According to Kmenta (1986, p. 594), Model 1 is best if the F-statistic is less than 1.0. Otherwise, 
Model 2 is preferred. The calculation indicated an F(23, 3901) = 4.698, with SSE1 = 154.35, SSE2 = 
150.19, n = 3931, K1 = 7, and K2 = 23. Thus, the null hypothesis that the regional location has no 
effect is rejected. Based on this result, the specific region does affect factors predicting financial 
distress. 
 Using the results in Table 6, a marginal change in six of the seven predictors in Model 2 
results in differential effects in Europe as compared to the US or Asia.  For example, the partial 
derivative of the probability of financial distress with respect to cash flow to sales is -0.732 for 
firms in Europe, as compared to -0.096 for US firms and -0.201 for firms in Asia.  This finding 
suggests that a marginal decline in cash flow to sales in Europe has a far more substantial impact in 
moving that firm toward financial distress than is the case in the US and Asia.  Similar differential 
effects are found for four other variables: return on operating assets before depreciation and 
amortization, notes payable to total assets, the current ratio, and sales to working capital.  
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For the operating leverage variable, depreciation and amortization to EBIT, the results have 
the opposite sign. Europe continues to diverge from Asia and the U.S, but now a marginal increase 
in operating leverage results in an increase in the probability of financial distress for European 
firms.  By contrast, for companies in the US and Asia, increases in operating leverage are related to 
reductions in the probability of financial distress.  European firms have outsourced much of their 
manufacturing capacity to emerging markets, such as Eastern Europe, and Asia.  Given the 
outsourcing of manufacturing capacity, increases in operating leverage may indicate a departure 
from the strategic deployment of assets and thus may be a signal of financial distress.  
 
Comparing the Global Model with Regional Indicators to Three Distinct Regional Models 
 The estimated coefficients in Model 2 indicate that the relationship between the likelihood 
of financial distress and all of the variables except TD/TA are significantly different for Europe 
when compared to the US or to Asia. This result suggests that it may be beneficial to explore 
whether three different models would be superior when predicting financial distress. That is, 
because manufacturing strategies may differ among the three regions, perhaps based upon indigent 
industries, their relative size or age, we may find that pooling across the three regions masks key 
differences that could be exploited during the modeling process.  In effect, we can test the 
following two hypotheses: 
 H1: A global model with regional indicators and interaction terms is best  
[same variables, possibly different coefficients] 
H2: Three separate models by region are best [different variables] 
To test the above hypotheses, separate models will be constructed for each of the three regions: US, 
Europe and Asia.  J-tests (Davidson and McKinnon, 1981) will be used to examine whether the 
Journal of Risk and Financial Management 
 145
incremental information contained in the different, non-nested model specifications is significant. 
The specific equation considered is: 
 Y = (1- )  +   + α α ε1 1 2 2X ß X ß       (4) 
where H1 and H2 above are indicated by their respective variables and coefficients.  Thus, testing 
H1 is basically testing whether or not α = 0. Because α is not identified, the J-test replaces β2 with 
ˆ
2β , where ˆ 2β  is the simple least squares estimator defined as 
-1
2 2 2 2
ˆ = ( )′ ′β X X X y . When H1 is true, 
α divided by its standard error is distributed N(0,1).  A second test is also performed because of the 
asymmetry of H1 and H2.  That is, when we test H1, we use H2 to challenge the validity of H1. 
However, when we reject H1, it may be some other model other than H2 that has caused us to reject 
H1.  To make a statement about H2, we conduct a second J-test to test α in the following equation: 
ˆY = (1- )  +   + α α ε2 2 1 2X ß X  ß       (5) 
which in effect is testing H2 against H1. Consistent inferences from the two tests would indicate 
which of the two models is preferred. Inconsistent results would indicate that neither model is 
useful to predict financial distress or that the data cannot discriminate between the models. 
To construct the individual models for each region, the modeling process began with the 
ratios in Table 3.  An iterative modeling process was used to create the three regional models 
similar to that used to create the global model. As before, coefficient sign and significance as well 
as the classification accuracy of the model were important criteria for model assessment. The three 
individual models are presented in Table 7 and the classification accuracy for each model is 
presented in Table 8.  
Insert Tables 7 and 8 about here 
Most notably, all three models contain cash flow margin, EBITDA to total assets and some 
debt to total asset ratio. Further, the same relationship exists between these variables and the 
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likelihood of financial distress in all three cases; namely, a negative relationship for the profit 
margin and profitability measures and a positive relationship for the financial leverage ratio.  
After that point, there are some similarities between pairs of models, such as both the US 
and Europe models include a liquidity ratio. As found with Model 1, the higher the liquidity, the 
more likely the firm is to be financially distressed in both cases.  This result may be somewhat 
counter intuitive, but the multivariate nature of the model requires that all other components are 
held constant before one assesses the independent effect of liquidity. Thus, holding all other factors 
constant, firms that do not adequately control their cash or liquid assets do not benefit from returns 
on those assets which makes it more likely than not that they experience financial distress.  It may 
be a signal that senior management is not deploying liquid assets for the optimal benefit of the firm. 
 Also, cash flow growth is negatively related to financial distress in both Europe and Asia.  
It is statistically significant in Europe, but marginally so in Asia.  The variable was kept in the Asia 
model, despite its marginal significance because it substantially improved classification accuracy 
rates. The Europe model also contains sales growth as a significant factor.  As with cash flow 
growth, sales growth has a negative relationship to financial distress. Thus, greater sales growth is 
associated with a decreased likelihood of financial distress. 
Further, sales turnover is found to be a significant predictor of financial distress for Europe 
and Asia.  In both models, the faster the turnover, the less likely a firm is financially distressed. The 
Europe and Asia models also include Depreciation and Amortization to EBIT, a measure of 
operating leverage. While the estimated coefficient for Europe is positive, that for Asia is negative. 
This discrepancy may indicate a difference in maturity and operating realities of the sample 
companies. That is, manufacturing firms in Europe most likely are conducting much of their actual 
operations in off-shore plants in Eastern Europe, India and Asia. Thus, European companies with 
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high operating leverage are more likely to become financially distressed. By contrast, firms in Asia 
are more likely the source of manufacturing plants; thus, those with high operating leverage are 
positioned to reap the benefits of increased scale, thereby improving profitability and thus reducing 
the likelihood of financial distress.  
Finally, the Asia model required two country dummy variables, one for Japan (not 
significant, but improves classification) and one for Singapore (statistically significant). These 
indicator variables suggest that there is a higher likelihood of financial distress for firms in these 
countries, before the effects of specific predictors are considered. In the case of Japan, slight 
increases in EBITDA/TA have substantially larger effects on the likelihood of financial distress 
than is the case for other Asian countries. More specifically, the large, negative, significant 
estimated coefficient for the interaction between the Japan dummy variable and EBITDA/TA 
suggests that slight increases in EBITDA/TA there produce greater reductions in the probability of 
financial distress as compared to other Asian countries. Given Japan’s tenuous economic condition 
at the turn of the 21st century, it makes sense that any improvement in a company’s profitability 
was a significant signal of financial health. 
As discussed above, J-tests are used to test which model specification, if any, is best to 
predict financial distress among firms across the three regions. The first J-test compared the global 
model (with interactions and dummy variables) to the separate models for each region. 
Specifically, the test estimated α in the following equation: 
1 2
ˆ(1 )Y M Mα α= − +          (6) 
where M1 is the global model and M2 are the separate regional models. The estimated α parameter 
was 8.475, with p-value of 0.000. Thus, the null hypothesis that α = 0 is rejected, indicating that 
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M2, separate models, is best for predicting Y, financial distress.  The second J-test was conducted 
to estimate α in the following equation: 
2 1
ˆ(1 )Y M Mα α= − +          (7) 
To test this model specification, individual regional regressions were run. The estimated α 
parameter for the US model was 1.136 with p-value of 0.396; for Europe, 1.122, with p-value of 
0.482; and for Asia, 2.576 with p-value of 0.077.  In all three cases, the null hypothesis that α = 0 
cannot be rejected; hence, M2 or separate models is best for predicting Y, financial distress.  Thus, 
both J-test results indicate that separate regional models are best for predicting financial distress. 
 
Model Robustness 
The three distinct regional models of financial distress have variables in common and 
variables that are distinct. Clearly the models are heterogeneous but are their predictions and their 
predictive abilities different? The underlying issue is whether the models are fundamentally 
different or whether their differences are cosmetic. This question is examined by considering how 
well each model predicts financial distress at companies in regions other than their own. 
For each region, 20 random companies (60 companies in total) are selected from the 
existing model building data base. In each region ten non-financially distressed companies and ten 
financially distressed companies are chosen. The data for these companies is then input into the 
models built for the other two regions. For example, Asian data is input into the European and U.S. 
models. This process is repeated for all three regions. The analysis considers the robustness of the 
models and their abilities to evaluate companies from other regions. 
None of the models appear to be robust, as seen in Table 9. Focusing primarily on 
predictions of financial distress, only US data resulted in reasonably good classification accuracy in 
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both the European and Asian models. That is, US data produced classification accuracies for 
financially distressed firms that were significantly different from chance (Asia Model) or 
marginally so (Europe Model). Inputting data from either Asia or Europe into the other two models 
produced classification accuracies that were not significantly different from chance (about 50% 
classification accuracy).  
These results are consistent with the pooling hypothesis test above. That is, the findings 
suggest that a regional model cannot accurately predict a company’s status if that company comes 
from outside the region. Nonsimilarity between the models implies that financial distress occurs for 
different reasons around the world. For example, US firms in financial distress tend to struggle 
with managing their long-term debt load and interest payments. European firms in financial distress 
have issues with working capital deployment, operating leverage and growth. Finally, Asian 
companies experiencing financial distress suffer from low turnover, too little operating leverage 
and high total debt.  By contrast, all of the models performed very well with data from other 
regions with respect to correctly classifying non-financially distressed companies.  Companies that 
are doing well appear to have similar characteristics regardless of location.  
Insert Table 9 here 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
The outcomes of globalization from dramatically higher rates of imports and exports to the 
movement of jobs between countries are appearing everywhere more rapidly than most analysts 
had expected. The typical consumer in America buys cars made in Korea, wine produced in Chile, 
and fashions from Italy. Likewise consumers in Korea bank at American institutions, people in 
Chile buy American computers, and consumers in Italy buy wine from California. Given this rapid 
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and overwhelming flow of goods and services between countries, it is not unreasonable to expect 
that firms across the globe have begun to adopt the same principles for inventory control, working 
capital management, hiring and firing, and factory utilization. In other words, one might expect 
firms to behave similarly regardless of which country they might reside.  
Corporate similarity might begin with firm formation and continue through to financial 
distress and bankruptcy. This study examined the tail end of that series of connections. It looks at 
whether firms on three regions had similar forces affecting them as they moved from strength to 
financial distress. Using a methodology based upon a multidimensional definition of financial 
distress the study compiled a list of companies on three regions that were financially distressed. 
Then using data from two years prior various explanations were tested of how the corporate decline 
occurred.  
The study posed three hypotheses concerning the form of the models explaining financial 
distress on the three regions. The null hypothesis assumed that a single global model would explain 
financial distress on each region. The two alternate hypotheses relaxed this assumption in various 
degrees. The null hypothesis was rejected in favor of a fully relaxed model which created 
individual financial distress models for each region.  
That globalization has not resulted in similar factors influencing corporate financial strength 
has macroeconomic implications. Differences between companies in the three regions and their 
operating ratios are shown in the paper to be dramatic. Factory age and efficiency, unionization, 
benefit payments as a supplement to wage levels, relationships with lenders and vendors are just 
some of the many differences one notes across regions. For example, as more production is moved 
to factories in Asia there is reason to be concerned about the health of the global economy due to 
the factors related to financial distress in Asian companies. Our results suggest that Asian 
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companies are more likely to become financially distressed when they do not have sufficient 
operating leverage to support sales volume or do not generate sufficient cash flow or operating 
earnings before depreciation charges.  
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Industry Name H FD H FD H FD H FD
2200 Textile Mill Products 19 4 37 4 71 11 127 19
2300 Apparel & Other Textile 54 7 38 1 45 3 137 11
2600 Paper & Allied Products 63 5 50 1 65 2 178 8
2800 Chemicals 87 14 145 20 320 10 552 44
2900 Petroleum & Coal 27 4 20 0 32 4 79 8
3000 Rubber 69 9 48 3 85 6 202 18
3100 Leather 19 2 7 1 7 2 33 5
3200 Stone, Clay, Glass & Concrete 35 2 94 2 100 12 229 16
3300 Primary Metals 88 12 82 1 135 7 305 20
3400 Fabricated Metals 79 6 59 4 90 8 228 18
3500 Industrial Machinery & Equipment 164 83 167 22 286 21 617 126
3600 Electrical & Electronic Equipment 217 46 148 33 310 18 675 97
3700 Transportation Equipment 80 27 79 4 156 6 315 37
3800 Instruments & Related Products 234 137 94 22 73 4 401 163
  Totals 1235 358 1068 118 1775 114 4078 590
 













Coverage (01) EBIT (00) EBIT (01) 
Net Income before 
Special Items (00)4 
Net Income before 
Special Items (01) 
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
US              
2800 NFD 986.21 144.75 1130.42 184.20 784.99 112.58 929.64 154.54 754.35 95.20 921.19 102.57 
2800 FD -23.28 -10.56 -26.89 -14.60 -23.88 -10.96 -27.62 -14.51 -25.34 -10.99 -28.98 -15.16 
3500 NFD 391.24 58.07 494.30 85.49 285.93 40.26 393.14 67.13 264.32 30.36 377.36 52.29 
3500 FD -8.43 -3.36 -5.36 -2.89 -12.31 -3.49 -8.03 -3.07 -12.70 -3.77 -7.88 -3.42 
3600 NFD 406.21 33.01 489.15 44.80 283.21 23.06 353.61 31.19 318.21 18.79 415.46 29.09 
3600 FD -18.88 -5.38 -16.16 -6.41 -23.21 -6.36 -19.56 -6.87 -24.70 -7.11 -20.42 -7.71 
Europe       
2800 NFD 862.81 90.50 1019.17 85.90 763.04 55.20 1447.45 436.80 581.90 48.54 756.61 52.02 
2800 FD -53.68 -15.95 -50.59 -11.92 -54.16 -14.11 -55.14 -15.10 -65.94 -14.71 -56.35 -11.98 
3500 NFD 309.87 32.59 373.57 43.85 283.94 36.28 572.03 54.64 190.24 18.96 266.02 26.16 
3500 FD -27.17 -13.85 -26.57 -10.09 -27.77 -11.75 -37.88 -35.01 -28.53 -14.86 -27.76 -12.66 
3600 NFD 336.85 32.05 351.76 34.52 246.05 24.02 340.59 27.85 222.05 17.99 248.35 23.68 
3600 FD -31.07 -14.05 -18.96 -8.51 -24.41 -9.89 -16.11 -6.32 -40.71 -19.61 -26.97 -10.12 
Asia      
2800 NFD 203.68 24.94 346.33 27.66 155.74 16.44 289.62 19.67 179.97 13.74 343.15 14.88 
2800 FD -64.00 -15.32 -80.73 -11.67 -65.50 -9.69 -76.90 -13.77 -82.27 -13.85 -159.13 -12.58 
3500 NFD 408.49 9.12 507.74 12.22 322.80 7.17 392.07 9.08 386.23 6.24 424.16 7.87 
3500 FD -37.77 -2.80 -53.87 -3.68 -36.18 -3.51 -52.06 -3.97 -63.96 -3.23 -67.59 -4.31 
3600 NFD 909.13 21.23 1256.42 23.18 445.39 14.24 722.10 17.12 443.61 12.58 736.53 13.46 
3600 FD -67.60 -5.58 -79.50 -5.65 -169.74 -7.45 -168.85 -6.23 -241.55 -12.55 -228.68 -6.64 
 
                                                 
3 EBITDA – Interest expense 
4 Net income + Special items (US); Net income before extraordinary items – Extraordinary items + Special items  (Non US) 




Data and Financial Ratios Employed 
 
Individual Financial Items Financial Ratios 
Status Inventories (Inv) Profit Margin Liquidity Operating Efficiency 
Net Sales (S) Inv (-1) EBITDA/S CA/CL COGS/Inv 
S (-1)5 Current Assets (CA) NI/S (CA-Inv)/CL S/AR 
COGS CA (-1) CF/S WC/TA S/TA 
COGS (-1) Net Fixed Assets (NFA) Profitability CA/TA AR/TA 
Deprec+Amort (DA) NFA (-1) EBITDA/TA NFA/TA S/WC 
DA (-1) Total Assets (TA) NI/TA Cash Position S/Inv 
SGA TA (-1) EBIT/TA Cash/CL AR/Inv 
SGA (-1) Accounts Payable (AP)  CF/TA Cash/DA (AR+Inv)/TA 
EBIT AP (-1) NI/EQ Cash/TA COGS/S 
EBIT (-1) Notes Payable (NP) Financial Leverage Growth  SGA/S 
Interest Expense (Int) NP (-1) TL/TA S-Growth % (COGS+SGA)/S 
Int (-1) Current Liabilities (CL) CL/TA NI/TA-Growth % DA/S 
Net Income (NI) CL (-1) CL/TL CF-Growth % DA/EBIT 
NI (-1) Long-term Debt (LTD) NP/TA Miscellaneous S/CA 
Cash LTD (-1) NP/TL EBIT/Int  
Cash (-1) Total Liabilities (TL) LTD/TA Int/S  
Accounts Receivable (AR) TL (-1) Current LTD/TA LTD/S  
AR (-1) Share Equity (EQ) EQ/TA CF/Int  
 EQ (-1) LTD/EQ CF/TL  
  TD/TA   
Calculated Items    
EBITDA = EBIT + DA   
EBITDA(-1) = EBIT (-1) + DA (-1)   
CF = NI + DA   
WC = CA - CL   
 
                                                 
5 Variable values specified as VARIABLE (-1) were collected in 1998. Otherwise, the variable value was collected in 1999. Thus, 
growth variables indicate growth rates from 1998 to 1999. 
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Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics across Regions, SIC Code6 and Status 
 
 US Europe Asia 
 NFD7 FD NFD FD NFD FD 
CF/Sales       
2800 0.087 -0.954 0.118 -6.510 0.097 -0.674 
3500 0.063 -1.856 0.083 -4.444 0.068 -0.297 
3600 0.192 -0.433 0.104 -2.001 0.103 -0.266 
EBITDA/TA       
2800 0.120 -0.448 0.138 -0.372 0.109 -0.075 
3500 0.116 -0.828 0.126 -0.100 0.086 -0.026 
3600 0.132 -0.696 0.160 -0.350 0.104 -0.110 
TD/TA       
2800 0.324 0.411 0.205 0.165 0.245 0.152 
3500 0.240 0.356 0.208 0.196 0.227 0.383 
3600 0.235 0.445 0.180 0.172 0.221 0.325 
 
                                                 
6 SIC 2800 is the chemicals and allied products industry; SIC 3500 is the industrial machinery and equipment industry; SIC 3600 is the 
electrical and electronic equipment industry. 
7 NFD indicates companies that are non-financially distressed; FD indicates companies that are financially distressed. 
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Table 5 
Estimated Coefficients for the Global Model 
Dependent Variable is Categorical (1 if financially distressed and 0 otherwise) 
 
Variables Estimated Coefficient p-value (two-tail) 
CF/Sales -0.141  .001** 
EBITDA/TA -2.129  .000** 
CA/CL 0.390  .000** 
Sales/WC -0.022  .028* 
DA/EBIT 0.004  .447 
NP/TA 0.043  .042* 
TD/TA 0.471  .000** 
Constant -2.440  .000** 
Nagelkerke R2 = .702 
* Significant beyond the .05 level of significance 
** Significant beyond the .01 level of significance 
 
Where: 
CF/Sales = Net Cash Flow/Sales 
EBITDA/TA = Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amoritization/Total Assets 
CA/CL = Current Assets/Current Liabilities 
Sales/WC = Sales/Working Capital 
DA/EBIT = Depreciation and amortization/EBIT 
NP/TA = Notes Payable/Total Assets 






Group Classified Percent Classified Correctly 
Non-financially distressed companies 96.4% 
Financially Distressed companies 82.1% 
All companies 94.5% 
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Table 6  
Comparison of the Global Model (Model 1) to the 


















CF/Sales -0.141 .001*** -0.096 .012** 
EBITDA/TA -2.129 .000*** -1.992 .000*** 
CA/CL 0.390 .000*** 0.273 .013** 
Sales/WC -0.022 .028** -0.003 .860 
DA/EBIT 0.004 .447 -0.018 .061* 
NP/TA 0.043 .042** 0.031 .173 
TD/TA 0.471 .000*** 0.402 .002*** 
Dummy Europe (E)   -0.481 .414 
Dummy Asia (A)   -0.571 .255 
CF/Sales  E   -0.636 .007*** 
EBITDA/TA  E   0.670 .081* 
CA/CL  E   0.633 .027** 
Sales/WC  E   -0.211 .027** 
DA/EBIT  E   0.059 .001*** 
NP/TA  E   0.321 .050** 
TD/TA  E   -0.387 .244 
CF/Sales  A   -0.105 .363 
EBITDA/TA  A   -0.396 .265 
CA/CL  A   0.170 .462 
Sales/WC  A   -0.035 .196 
DA/EBIT  A   0.010 .543 
NP/TA  A   -0.003 .983 
TD/TA  A   0.257 .324 
Constant -2.440 .000*** -2.245 .000*** 
Nagelkerke R2  .702  .716 
*     Significant beyond the .10 level of significance 
**   Significant beyond the .05 level of significance 
*** Significant beyond the .01 level of significance 
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Table 7 
Estimated Coefficients for Asia, Europe, and U.S. Models^ 
 
 
Variables US Europe Asia 
CF/Sales 
 
-0.128*** -1.090** -0.714*** 
EBITDA/TA 
 









 Before Tax 
 
-0.084   











DA/EBIT  0.068*** 
 
-0.338*** 
% Change in Sales  -0.964*** 
 
 
% Change in Cash
 Flow 
 
 -0.082*** -0.010# 
Japan Dummy 
 
  1.002 
Singapore Dummy 
 
  2.384** 
Japan x EBITDATA 
 
  -9.138*** 
Constant 
 
-4.298*** -4.436*** -2.566*** 
Nagelkerke R2 0.726 0.689 0.565 
^Coefficients are scaled. All estimated coefficients are the property of BBK, Ltd.  
 Dependent Variable is Categorical (1 if financially distressed and 0 otherwise) 
*     Significant beyond the .10 level of significance, two-tailed. 
**   Significant beyond the .05 level of significance, two-tailed. 
*** Significant beyond the .01 level of significance, two-tailed. 
#     Significant beyond the .10 level of significance, one-tailed. 
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Table 8 
Classification Accuracy in Asia, Europe, and U.S. Models 
 




n = 1,127 
97.0% 
n = 908 
95.4% 
n = 1,056 
Financially Distressed Companies 87.0% 
n = 276 
81.2% 
n = 101 
81.3% 
n = 80 
All Companies 93.2% 
n = 1,403 
95.4% 
n = 1,009 
94.4% 
n = 1,136 
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Table 9 
Comparing Model Predictions Using Data from Other Regions 
 
Model Source of Data 





Asian Europe 60% 100% 
Asian U.S. 100% 80% 
    
European Asia 50% 100% 
European U.S. 80% 80% 
    
U.S. Asia 10% 100% 
U.S.  Europe 60% 100% 
 
 
 
